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INFLUENCING THE PUBLIC:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
DEFINING THE TAX STATUS OF
CORPORATE GRASSROOTS LOBBYING
"Grassroots" lobbying has become a powerful means for business, labor,
and other interest groups to make their demands known to Congress.'
While it is not a new method of influencing government action, this lobby-
ing technique and the laws regulating its practices have recently become
the subject of heated controversy. 2 Purported victories by grassroots lob-
byists have spawned a backlash movement aimed at insuring that indirect
lobbying is used fairly. In an attempt to monitor grassroots lobbying activ-
ities more closely, the House of Representatives passed a lobbying reform
bill that included a provision requiring organizations to report indirect ap-
peals to Congress in addition to their presently reported direct lobbying
1. Grassroots lobbying does not seek to persuade legislators directly, but attempts to
influence public opinion about legislative matters and encourage communication of that
opinion to elected representatives.
2. The potency of this weapon has been demonstrated by the significant legislative
victories attributed to it. For example, the common situs picketing bill, H.R. 4250, that
would have allowed unions with a grievance against a single contractor to picket and poten-
tially to close down an entire construction site, was defeated by the House of Representa-
tives. 123 CONG. REC. H2508-09 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1977). AFL-CIO Building and
Construction Trades Department President Robert A. Georgine stated that some congress-
men claimed that they voted against the bill "because they got more pressure from business
than from us." BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1977. Simi-
larly, the consumer agency bill, H.R. 6805, was defeated in the House of Representatives by
a narrow vote. 124 CONG. REC. H827 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1978). 'Supporters of the bill, includ-
ing White House Press Secretary Jody Powell, attributed the loss to a well organized and
effective opposition. 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 323 (1978). See also Cohen, New Lobbying
Rules May Influence Grass-Roots PoliticalAction, NAT'L J., May 27, 1978, at 832.
Impressed by the successes of business, labor interests also adopted the grassroots tech-
nique to their advantage in a lengthy Senate battle over the labor reform bill, H.R. 8410.
Ultimately, the bill was recommitted to the Senate Human Resources Committee-a ma-
neuver considered tantamount to killing a bill-following rejection of a sixth cloture at-
tempt. 124 CONG. REC. S9405-12 (daily ed. June 22, 1978). Senator Dale Bumpers, one of
the few initially uncommitted Senators in the fifth cloture vote to end fillibuster on the labor
bill, stated, "[lI]abor felt senators were impressed by the volume of mail they were getting, so
they felt they had to generate a like volume." Bumpers also complained that grassroots
lobbying at one point threatened to paralyze his office operations by the sheer volume of
mail it produced. Dewar, "Grass-Roots"Lobbying in FullFlower, Wash. Post, May 28, 1978,
§ A, at 2, cols. 3 and 1.
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activities. 3 In another significant reform effort, a House subcommittee has
initiated a campaign to curb widespread abuses of the tax laws governing
grassroots lobbying. Although the Internal Revenue Code prohibits de-
ductions for business' grassroots lobbying expenses,4 recent congressional
investigations reveal that substantial taxpayer noncompliance and ineffec-
tive Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement of this law exist, resulting
in estimated losses to the Treasury of millions of dollars annually. 5
Much more is at issue, however, than the mere loss of revenue. To the
extent that a corporation improperly deducts its grassroots lobbying ex-
penses, it gains an unfair advantage over other businesses and over indi-
vidual taxpayers, for whom these expenses are also nondeductible. 6 This
advantage amounts to federal subsidization of corporate propaganda pro-
grams, since the dollars expended are those properly subject to income
taxation. There is legitimate public concern that this subsidy, when com-
3. See H.R. 8494, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(b)(7) (1978). The Senate version of this bill,
S. 2971, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(b)(5) (1978), also requires registration of "lobbying solicita-
tions." The bill was stalled in committee indefinitely, and prospects for passage of a lobby-
ing reform bill in the 96th Congress are uncertain.
The current Regulation of Lobbying Act requires only reporting of .'lobbying in its com-
monly accepted sense'. . . direct communication with members of Congress on pending or
proposed federal legislation." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954) (interpret-
ing 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1976)). Accord, United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953).
4. I.R.C. § 162(e)(2)(B). This section states that businesses will not be allowed a de-
duction as an ordinary and necessary expense for amounts paid or incurred "in connection
with any attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to legisla-
tive matters, elections, or referendums." The direct lobbying expenses of businesses (i.e.,
costs of appearances before Congress or other legislatures) are deductible under I.R.C.
§ 162(e)(I)(A). For further discussion of these Code provisions, see text accompanying
notes 86-106, infra. As of May, 1978, of the total 24,802 tax cases pending before all courts,
only eleven involved improper deductions for grassroots lobbying expenses. IRS Adminis-
tration of the Tax Laws Relating to Lobbying (Part 1): Hearings Before the Commerce, Con-
sumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 204 (1978) (Statement of Lester G. Fant, III, Attorney, Cohen & Uretz,
Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
5. This loss of tax revenue has been estimated to reach tens of millions of dollars each
year. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 380 (opening statement of Chairman Benjamin S. Ro-
senthal). The Subcommittee, investigating IRS enforcement of I.R.C. § 162(e)(2)(B) since
the summer of 1977, also estimates that at least $1 billion is spent on grassroots lobbying per
year. Id
6. I.R.C. § 212 only allows individuals a deduction for ordinary and necessary ex-
penses incurred for the production or collection of income, the management, conservation or
maintenance of property held for the production of income, or the determination, collection
or refund of taxes. Business expenses may be deducted by individual taxpayers only to the
extent allowable under § 162(a). Since § 162(e)(2)(B) is a limitation on § 162(a), its prohibi-
tion of deductions for grassroots lobbying expenses extends to individuals as well as busi-
nesses. For an application of this theory allowing an individual to deduct his business-
related direct lobbying expenses under §§ 162(e)(l)(A) and (B), 162(a), and 212, see Jordan
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 770 (1973).
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bined with multi-million dollar corporate budgets, would allow large busi-
ness interests to overwhelm the public with political advocacy to such an
extent that other viewpoints would be smothered.
7
On the other hand, denying a deduction for these activities could violate
the constitutional rights of corporations. The Internal Revenue Code does
not prohibit corporations from attempting to influence the public; instead,
it merely requires that they pay for these activities out of their own pock-
ets. At the same time, the Code permits charitable organizations to retain
their tax exempt status while engaging in grassroots lobbying.8 One trade
association has therefore claimed that because of this differential tax treat-
ment, the Code denies corporations the equal protection of the laws.9 In
addition, because disallowance of deductions for grassroots lobbying could
discourage constitutionally protected debate on issues of public signifi-
cance,' 0 the denial arguably chills the exercise of corporate first amend-
ment rights."I Given the sixteenth amendment's mandate that all income
from whatever source derived may be taxed,' 2 however, this argument
presents a conflict at the constitutional level.
More important is the problem of defining a nondeductible grassroots
lobbying expense. While Internal Revenue Code section 162(e)(2)(B) pro-
hibits business deductions for grassroots lobbying activities, the imple-
menting regulations allow corporations to deduct the cost of goodwill and
social interest messages.' 3 Therefore, a great deal of confusion exists re-
garding the tax status applicable to a broad range of advertisements which
7. See Sethi, Countering Corporate Ads, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1978, § D, at 2, col. 1.
8. New I.R.C. § 4911, introduced in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1307(b), 90 Stat. 1520, allows a § 50 1(c)(3) charity to elect to spend a declining percentage,
ranging from 20% to 5% of its overall exempt purpose expenditures for lobbying. Up to a
quarter of this permissible lobbying expenditure may be used for grassroots lobbying. See
text accompanying notes 225-234, infra.
9. This equal protection argument is one of the issues currently being litigated in Na-
tional Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Blumenthal, No. 78-0874 (D.D.C., filed May 16, 1978), discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 223-241.
10. Although a grassroots lobbying campaign may merely request that the recipient ex-
press his support of the campaign's objectives by mailing his congressman a form letter, the
individual's response has been characterized as "the purest form of the right to petition the
government." Hearings, supra note 4, at 375 (Statement of David E. Landau, Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union).
11. The proposition that corporate political speech is protected by the first amendment
was firmly established by the Supreme Court's recent decision in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 192-204.
12. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." U.S. CONST., amend. XVI.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (1965), as amended by T.D. 6996, Jan. 18, 1969.
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arguably could be deductible. In response to congressional pressure, 14 the
IRS recently issued four revenue rulings which clarify the meaning of
"grassroots". 15 These rulings define the boundaries of deductible trade as-
sociation communications, and make clear that lobbying solicitations are
not deductible if they attempt to develop a grassroots point of view by
words, pictures, or other means, even in the absence of an explicit request
to contact legislators.
Corporate observers have nevertheless challenged the revenue rulings by
claiming that they enlarge the scope of nondeductible activities beyond the
prohibitions of the Internal Revenue Code.' 6 These critics argue that the
rulings impose unauthorized additional costs which would curtail, and in
some cases halt, corporate grassroots lobbying communications.
It is thus apparent that the tax status of corporate grassroots lobbying
expenses raises significant policy issues. This comment assesses the current
status of these expenses in light of the history of the Internal Revenue
Code section 162(e)(2)(B) and the effectiveness of recent corporate grass-
roots lobbying endeavors.
I. GRASSROOTS LOBBYING DEFINED
A. Evolution of the "Tax Neutrality" Premise
"Deductions are a matter of grace, not of right."' 17 This oft-repeated
maxim is the key to understanding the vagaries of tax law. In the exercise
of its constitutionally granted taxing power, Congress possesses unfettered
discretion to grant or deny deductions as it chooses.' 8 In 1913, Congress
first exercised this discretion by providing a deduction for "necessary"
business expenditures in determining taxable net income. ' 9 Later codified
as a deduction for all "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, 20 these
14. The IRS' "panicky" reaction to the investigation conducted by the House Subcom-
mittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs is discussed in Owen, 'Grassroots'
Lobbying Activities--Examining the IRS' Reaction, Legal Times of Washington, July 20,
1978, at 13, col. 3.
15. Rev. Ruls. 78-111, 78-112, 78-113 and 78-114, 1978-1 C.B. 41, 42, 43, 44, discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 162-174.
16. The question of whether these Revenue Rulings properly interpret § 162(e)(2)(B),
and the underlying issue of that section's constitutionality in light of the first amendment,
are also being litigated in National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Blumenthal, supra note 9. These issues
are discussed in detail at text accompanying notes 175-241 infra.
17. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citing Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).
18. U.S. CoNsT., amend. XVI, construed in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1,
21, (1916), and Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
19. Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, Ch. 16, § 11 (B), 38 Stat. 167.
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. i, § 23(a), 53 Stat. 12 (now I.R.C. § 162(a)).
[Vol. 28:313
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deductions encompass a wide variety of corporate expenditures that are
"appropriate and helpful" and do not frustrate sharply defined national or
state policies.2' It is apparent that the purpose of this deduction was to
promote free enterprise by insuring that businesses are taxed only on in-
come in excess of operating costs. In spite of the impact that grassroots
lobbying expenditures could have upon the growth of corporate activities,
they have traditionally been excluded from "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses.
Section 162(e)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code disallows a deduction
for any amount "paid or incurred in connection with any attempt to influ-
ence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to legislative
matters, elections, or referendums. '22 Early Treasury Regulations disal-
lowed deductions "for lobbying expenses, the promotion or defeat of legis-
lation, and the exploitation of propaganda other than trade advertising.
'23
The historical reasons for denying a deduction for these activities are
unclear. The proscription originally appeared in regulations primarily ad-
dressed to the denial of corporate deductions for charitable contribu-
tions, 24 and initially may have been considered a restriction on deductions
for such contributions rather than for business expenditures. 25 While the
Revenue Act of 1934 did not prohibit the deduction of lobbying expendi-
tures as business expenses, it did restrict the tax exemption for charitable
organizations. Only those organizations which did not engage in substan-
21. "Ordinary" has been defined primarily in the negative to refer to those expenses
that are not incurred to acquire capital assets, Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950), are not personal, Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939),
affid without opinion, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940), and do not contravene public policy,
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943). "Necessary" has been construed as
imposing only the minimal requirement that the expenses be "appropriate and helpful" to
the taxpayer's business, Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
22. The legislative history of section 162(e)(2)(B) notes that although it was the first
legislative measure to address the issue, the section did not change prior law regarding the
deductibility of grassroots lobbying expenses. See S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3304, 3326 (no deduction for
grassroots activity except to the extent allowed by existing law); cf. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1967). With respect to the background of section 162(e)(2)(B), see
generally Weaver, Taxes and Lobbying-The Issue Resolved, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 938
(1963); Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying.: Defining and Attaining
the Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (1968); and Liles, A New Look at "Ordinary
and Necessary" Business Expenses ("Lobbying and T & E"), 21ST ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAx 1165, 1166-1173 (1963).
23. The previous administrative provisions are contained in T.D. 2137, 17 TREAS. DEC.
INT. REV. 48, 57-58 (1915); Treas. Reg. 33, art. 143 (1918); Treas. Reg. 62, art. 562 (1922);
Treas. Reg. 74, art. 262 (1931); Treas. Reg. 101, arts. 23(o)-1, 23(q)-I (1938); and Treas. Reg.
118, §§ 39.23(o)-1(f), 39.23(q)-l(a) (1953).
24. T.D. 2137, 17 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 48, 57-58 (1915).
25. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 805.
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tial propaganda or other attempts to influence legislation were allowed to
remain tax exempt and receive deductible contributions. 26 When allow-
ance of the charitable contribution deduction was extended to corporations
in 1935, this lobbying limitation was included.27 Thus, the early regula-
tory prohibition against lobbying as an ordinary and necessary business
deduction may have been confused with the statutory disallowance of de-
ductions for charitable contributions to organizations engaged in lobbying.
In turn, this confusion may have led courts to believe that there existed a
statutory basis for the regulation when apparently there was none.
28
The correct interpretation of the statutory prohibition on tax exempt
charities' lobbying activities was established in Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in Slee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.29 This case involved
the denial of a deduction for the taxpayer's gifts to the American Birth
Control League. The Second Circuit ruled that since the League had in-
cluded among its declared objects the enlistment of legislative support to
effect the repeal of laws dealing with the prevention of conception, its pur-
poses were not exclusively charitable, scientific or educational. 30 There-
fore, contributions to the League were denied deductibility. 3' Had the
League's political activities been limited to attempts to relieve itself of le-
gal restraints in order to better conduct its charity, a deduction would have
been permissible. The more general nature of those activities, however,
precluded its purposes from qualifying as the requisite exclusively charita-
ble, educational or scientific character.32 The court determined that:
"[Plolitical agitation as such is outside the statute, however innocent the
aim. . . .Controversies of that sort must be conducted without public
subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them."' 33 Thus, although the
holding of Slee was limited to construction of the statute regulating deduc-
tion of charitable contributions, its announcement of the "tax neutrality
premise" was significant to the corporate grassroots lobbying issue.
26. The statute further required the organization to be established and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes to qualify for ex-
emption and deductible contributions. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(o)(2), 48 Stat.
690. The current parallel provisions are I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2) (deductible charitable contribu-
tions) and 501(c)(3) (tax exempt charitable organizations).
27. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1016, adding § 23(r), which ap-
peared as Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(g), 53 Stat. 15. The lobbying limitation on
charitable deductions is currently codified at I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).
28. See Liles, supra note 22, at 1167.
29. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
30. Id at 184-85.
31. See note 26, supra, explaining the statutory standards for deductible contributions.




Also apposite was Grosjean v. American Press CO.,3 4 a case examining
the constitutionality of a state license tax imposed upon newspapers selling
advertising with circulations in excess of 20,000 copies weekly. The tax
was challenged as an abridgement of freedom of the press in contravention
of the due process clause and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
35
The Supreme Court reiterated that, while a corporation is not a "citizen"
within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause, it is a "per-
son" meriting protections under the equal protection and due process
clauses. 36 Looking at the effect of the tax, the Court noted that it created a
double restraint: first, by curtailing the amount of revenue realized from
advertising, and second, by restricting circulation.37 Drawing an analogy
to the role that British "taxes on knowledge" had played in fomenting the
American Revolution and in precipitating adoption of the first amend-
ment, the Court held the taxes invalid.38 That early invidious use of taxa-
tion had made evident that "mere exemption from previous censorship
was. . . too narrow a view of the liberty of the press."' 39 The words "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . ." were thus found to bring within their scope the modes of re-
straint embodied by these forms of taxation.40 Since the state license tax
was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the
circulation of information,"'4' it was found to violate the first amendment
as applied to the states by the fourteenth. The Court concluded that the
tax was unconstitutional under the due process clause because it impermis-
sibly abridged the freedom of the press.
4 2
34. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
35. The question presented by Grosjean was whether the state license tax violated the
fourteenth amendment's provisions that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. 297 U.S. at 244 (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1868), regarding the
privileges and immunities clause ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, and Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592
(1896), and Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1897), regarding the equal protection and due
process of law clauses.)
37. 297 U.S. at 244-245.
38. Id. at 246. In 1712, the British Parliament levied a tax on advertisements and, in
1765, imposed a stamp tax on newspapers sent to the colonies. Revenue, however, was only
a subordinate concern; the dominant motive was to prevent dissemination of information on
governmental affairs.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 248.
41. Id. at 250.
42. The Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the tax constituted a denial of
the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 251.
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Although the Supreme Court in Grosjean carefully scrutinized the im-
pact of a state license tax upon the constitutional guarantee of a free press,
early judicial interpretation of the regulations denying businesses a deduc-
tion for lobbying activities gave no consideration to first amendment is-
sues. Initially, courts interpreted the regulations to allow deductions if the
activities involved were not illegal, illegitimate, or unethical. Nevertheless,
these early decisions turned not only on the legality of the expenditures,
but on the fact that they were ordinary and necessary to the taxpayers'
businesses. In Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. Commissioner,43 the
Board of Tax Appeals allowed a railroad to deduct a goodwill campaign
undertaken in anticipation of railroad deregulation, reasoning that the ex-
penditure was vitally connected with the railroad's business. Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit allowed an attorney to deduct the costs incurred in success-
fully advocating proposed legislation before the Alabama governor and
state legislature in Lucas v. Wofford.44 As in Salt Lake Railroad, the court
regarded the activities as an integral business expense and distinguished
them from lobbying.
This trend toward deductibility was reversed by Sunset Scavenger Co. v.
Commissioner,45 which disallowed deductions for expenses incurred by a
garbage collectors' association to prevent passage of unfavorable legisla-
tion. The Court reasoned that by reenacting the business expense provi-
sion without adding a deduction for lobbying expenses, Congress had
declared the administrative interpretation consistent with the intent of the
statute. Thus, the ambiguous reenactment rule of statutory construction
was employed to broaden the interpretation of the regulation, invalidating
the deduction of lobbying expenses arguably ordinary and necessary to the
taxpayer's business.46
The question of the regulation's scope reached the Supreme Court in
Textile Mills Security Corp. v. Commissioner,47 which presented a persua-
sive fact situation for upholding the broader interpretation. An American
43. 18 B.T.A. 168 (1929).
44. 49 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1931).
45. 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936), rev'g 31 B.T.A. 758 (1934). This decision noted the
results in Lucas, 49 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1931), and Salt Lake Railroad, 18 B.T.A. 168 (1920),
but pointed out that in both of those cases the effect of the regulation had been disregarded
entirely, and that they were therefore not sound authority. 84 F.2d at 457.
46. Id. Under the reenactment rule, legislative silence in reenacting a statute that has
been interpreted administratively indicates approval of the administrative interpretation.
The doctrine is based on the unreliable assumption that Congress read and approved the
predecessor regulation before reenacting the law. Spiegel, Deductibility of Lobbying, Initia-
tie and Referendum Expenses. .4 Problem for Congressional Consideration, 45 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1957).
47. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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corporation, hired by German textile interests to secure passage of legisla-
tion permitting recovery of properties seized during World War I, sought
to deduct salaries paid to a publicist and two lawyers involved in this cam-
paign. The Court dismissed the argument that the regulation did not ap-
ply because it appeared under the charitable contribution section rather
than under the business deduction section of the Code.48 Further, the
Court determined that the Treasury had neither usurped the legislative
function nor contravened any congressional policy by segregating this par-
ticular group of expenses and declaring them nondeductible.4 9 Like the
Ninth Circuit in Sunset Scavenger, the Textile Mills Court did not address
any first amendment considerations.
The relationship between taxation and first amendment rights was de-
fined with clarity, however, in Speiser v. Randall.50 This decision over-
turned a California statute requiring the taking of a loyalty oath as a
condition for a property tax exemption. The Court's ruling was based on
the precept that discriminatory denial of an exemption for engaging in
speech is a limitation on free speech. The Supreme Court stated that the
denial of an exemption to parties who engaged in certain forms of speech
penalized them for such speech, and further, that it deterred them from
engaging in the speech as if a fine had been imposed in violation of pro-
tected constitutional guarantees. The Court rejected the argument that be-
cause a tax exemption is a privilege rather than a right, its denial would
not infringe speech; accordingly, it ruled that the denial was "frankly
aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 51 As in Grosjean, the state's
taxing power had been used to forge a device specifically designed to re-
strict speech.
52
Speiser's holding, however, rested on narrow, procedural grounds. The
Court assumed, without deciding, that the state could deny tax exemptions
to persons engaging in proscribed speech,53 and focused its inquiry only on
the procedural safeguards accorded protected speech. While the purpose
48. Id. at 338. The regulation in question, Treas. Reg. 74, art. 262, promulgated under
the 1928 Act, was entitled "Donations by Corporations" and provided: "Sums of money
expended for lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation, the exploitation of
propaganda, including advertising other than trade advertising, and contributions for cam-
paign expenses, are not deductible from gross income."
49. The Court found statutory authority for the lobbying limitation for corporate chari-
table contributions. 314 U.S. at 338, n.18 (citing the Revenue Act of 1938, 26 U.S.C. § 23(q),
52 Stat. 447 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (1976))). That statute, however, did not
support an inference that Congress intended to prohibit deductions for lobbying activities.
50. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
51. Id. at 519 (quoting American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402
(1950)).
52. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
53. 357 U.S. at 520.
19791
Catholic University Law Review
of the oath had been to relieve the tax assessor of the burden of ascertain-
ing the facts,54 it had placed a burden on the appellants to justify their
claim of exemption. Since the burden of proving his speech outside the
proscribed category rested on the taxpayer throughout the entire judicial
process, the Court held that the California provision did not provide ade-
quate procedural due process to defend constitutionally protected speech.
Analogizing to an alleged criminal's right to retain his liberty until proven
guilty, the Supreme Court held that "when the constitutional right to speak
is sought to be deterred by a State's general taxing program due process
demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward
with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition."' 5" This holding affirmed the
due process principles announced in Grosean.
Although Speiser demonstrated that the grant of a tax exemption could
not be conditioned so as to chill constitutionally protected speech, it did
not consider whether the regulations' denial of a deduction for corporate
grassroots lobbying expenses imposed an unconstitutional restriction on
protected speech. Furthermore, the narrow facts of Textile Mills raised
doubt as to whether the regulations proscribed the deduction of grassroots
lobbying expenses under all circumstances. These questions were resolved
by the Supreme Court's opinion in Cammarano v. United States.
56
In Cammarano and its consolidated companion case, F Strauss & Son,
Inc. v. Commissioner,57 wholesale liquor distributors had deducted dues
paid to trade associations that waged statewide publicity campaigns aimed
at persuading voters to defeat referenda to establish state-owned liquor
stores and prohibition. The Commissioner's disallowance of the deduc-
tions was affirmed by the District Court in Cammarano58 and the Tax
Court in Strauss,59 and by both courts of appeals.60 The liquor distribu-
tors made four arguments for reversal. First, they contended that expendi-
tures made to promote or defeat the passage of legislation through
persuasion of the general public were distinguishable from expenditures
made to influence legislative bodies directly. The regulations could not
54. Id. at 517. The Court distinguished cases holding valid the loyalty oaths required of
public employees because in those cases "there was no attempt directly to control speech but
rather to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of
governmental concern." Id. at 527.
55. Id. at 528-29.
56. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
57. See 358 U.S. at 502.
58. Cammarano v. United States, 51 AFTR 1378 (D.C. Wash. 1956) (unpublished in F.
Supp.).
59. F. Strauss & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 591 (1957).
60. Cammarano v. United States, 246 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1957); F. Strauss & Son, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 251 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 28:313
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properly be construed as applicable to the expenses of running a campaign
aimed at the voters. Second, they suggested that the regulations in any
case were inapplicable in connection with initiative measures. Third, they
maintained that expenditures incurred to prevent the liquidation of a busi-
ness were clearly "ordinary and necessary" under the business deduction
section of the Code, 61 rendering the regulations invalid as contrary to the
Code. Finally, they argued that the regulations were unconstitutional
under the first amendment.
62
The Court responded to the first argument by stating that Textile Mills
could not be read to limit the regulations to direct dealings with legislators
because the deductions at issue in that case included publicity expendi-
tures.63 Furthermore, the courts of appeals had consistently applied the
regulations to expenditures for publicity directed to the general public on
legislative matters.64 The Court also observed that such a reading would
make the entire regulation, except for the reference to "lobbying", mere
surplusage.65 The distributors' second argument fared no better. Initia-
tives were held to be "legislation" within the meaning of the regulations
because, had they been passed, the measures involved would have had the
force of law as much as if they had been enacted by the legislature.66 The
Court also noted that all prior courts considering the issue had found the
regulation applicable to referenda.
67
61. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a)(1)(A), 53 Stat. 12 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162
(a) (1976)).
62. 358 U.S. at 504.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 505 (citing Revere Racing Ass'n v. Scanlon, 232 F.2d 816 (Ist Cir. 1956)
(deductions disallowed for expenditures by dog-racing corporation to persuade majority of
voters to vote the affirmative on whether system of pari-mutuel betting should be permitted
in the county)); American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126 (4th Cir.
1953) (contributions to tax association organized to carry on propaganda with ultimate ob-
jective of revision in tax structure held not deductible); Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner,
195 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1952) (disallowed deductions for Dairy's contributions to nonprofit
organization established to conduct research on disparities in tax status of competitor dairies
and to disseminate information).
65. 358 U.S. at 505. This judicial comment is significant in light of the Court's prior
decisions in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953), and United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954) holding that the term "lobbying", as used in the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1976), is to be construed to refer only to "lobbying in
its commonly accepted sense" of direct communication with members of Congress on pend-
ing or proposed legislation, and not as extending to attempts "to saturate the thinking of the
community."
66. 358 U.S. at 505-06.
67. Id. at 506 (citing Revere Racing Ass'n v. Scanlon, 232 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1956)); Old
Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 676 (1934), ajj'd on other grounds,
293 U.S. 289 (1934) (contribution by cement company to fund to promote state-wide refer-
endum for increased gasoline sales tax levy held not deductible); Mosby Hotel Co. v. Coin-
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The Court also disagreed with petitioners' third and primary contention
that expenditures incurred to preserve a business from destruction were
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses as a matter of law.
Distinguishing prior Supreme Court precedent in which a mail-order den-
tist was able to deduct attorney's fees incurred in defending against a pos-
tal fraud charge that would have terminated his business,68 the
Cammarano Court emphasized the "sharply defined national or state poli-
cies" clearly expressed by the regulation in the instant case.69 Like the
Ninth Circuit in Sunset Scavenger,70 the Court also drew on the reenact-
ment doctrine to validate the interpretation of the regulation denying de-
ductibility for these expenses.71 As in Textile Mills,72 the Court relied
upon congressional denial of an exemption to otherwise tax exempt chari-
table organizations that engage in lobbying activities, as well as upon the
parallel denial of deductions to individuals and corporations contributing
to such organizations as further evidence of a statutory policy. 7 3 In inter-
preting this congressional action as statutory authority to deny business
expense deductions for lobbying expenses, the Cammarano Court over-
looked the fact that Congress had never placed a similar lobbying limita-
tion on the tax exemption of trade associations or labor unions. Those
organizations were allowed to remain tax exempt regardless of the extent
or type of lobbying they practiced. 74 Thus, the Court's conclusion that the
regulations codified the tax neutrality premise announced by Judge Hand
in Slee75 rested on no statutory foundation.
With respect to the liquor distributors' fourth argument that the regula-
tion presented a constitutional issue under the first amendment, the Court
replied that:
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they
missioner, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) $ 54,288 (1954) (contributions to organization formed to secure
repeal of Kansas prohibition laws held not deductible); McClintock-Trunkey Co. v. Com-
missioner, 19 T.C. 297 (1952), rev'don other grounds, 217 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1954) (contribu-
tions to Good Roads Association and Taxpayer's League, associations that engaged in
lobbying activities, held not deductible).
68. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
69. 358 U.S. at 508.
70. 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936), discussed in text accompanying notes 45 and 46 supra.
71. 358 U.S. at 510.
72. 314 U.S. 326 (1941), discussed in text accompanying notes 47-49, supra.
73. 358 U.S. at 512 (citing Revenue Act of 1934, §§ 101(6), 23(o)(2), 48 Stat. 700, 690;
Revenue Act of 1935, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1016; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 1, §§ 23(o)(2),
23(q)(2), 101(6); 53 Stat. 14, 15, 33 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D) and 501(c)(3))).
74. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 1, §§ 101(1) and (7), 53 Stat. 33 (current version at
I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(5) and (6)) did not condition these organizations' exemptions on abstention
from political activity.
75. 358 U.S. at 512. See text accompanying notes 33 supra.
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engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply be-
ing required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own
pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required
to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Non-
discriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums
expended to promote or defeat legislation is plainly not 'aimed at
the suppression of dangerous ideas.' . . . Rather, it appears to us
to express a determination by Congress that since purchased pub-
licity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect, di-
rectly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the
community should stand on the same footing as regards its
purchase so far as the Treasury of the United States is con-
cerned. 76 (Citations omitted.)
The petitioners had based their first amendment argument on the Speiser
opinion. Although the facts of Caminarano appear to be analogous, close
examination of the two cases shows that they are more than nominally
distinguishable. The denial of an exemption in Speiser was clearly aimed
at the suppression of "dangerous ideas" 77 and imposed a special tax only
on those who refused to disavow advocacy of the overthrow of the United
States government. Cammarano, on the other hand, did not discriminate
against a particular type of constitutionally protected speech on the basis
of content, but merely denied deductions to all businesses for their ex-
penses incurred in attempts to influence legislation. The decision was thus
distinguishable from Grostean as well. The license tax at issue in that case
was found to violate the first amendment because it was designed to re-
strict speech on the basis of the speaker's identity.78 The deduction disal-
lowance approved in Cammarano, however, did not create such a prior
restraint but left all businesses equally free to voice any political opinion.
The absence of a first amendment violation was underscored by Justice
Douglas' concurrence. He observed that if Congress had denied all deduc-
tions for "ordinary and necessary" expenses to businesses spending money
to promote a legislative view, it would have placed a penalty on the exer-
cise of first amendment rights coextensive with that invalidated in Speiser.
Since Congress had disallowed only some of these expenses in
76. Id. at 513.
77. 358 U.S. at 519.
78. In Grosjean, the Court invalidated a tax imposed solely upon newspapers of a cer-
tain size and character - those most effective in conveying information to the public. But
the Grosjean Court specifically cautioned:
It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspa-
pers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the
government. But this is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with a
long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press. Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
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Cammarano, it followed that such a penalty had not been realized. Doug-
las emphasized that deductions are a matter of discretion, not of right.
79
He also stressed that a decision permitting a deduction for expenses in-
curred to influence public opinion would endorse the dubious view that
first amendment rights cannot be fully realized unless subsidized by the
government through tax exemptions. This proposition was found to con-
tradict prior Supreme Court decisions,80 and to conflict with the premise
that first amendment rights are most effectively realized when the govern-
ment maintains a completely hands-off policy toward speech.
81
Cammarano's introduction of the "tax neutrality" policy into the field of
business deductions was further justified by the unique nature of expenses
designed to influence legislation. 82 The amount of money that can be
spent to promote or defeat legislation and be deducted for tax purposes
was and remains a matter of concern to the extent that it allows parties
possessing inordinate wealth to deduct the purchase of legislation support-
ing their interests. Recognizing that the right of the people to petition the
government for redress of grievances is paramount, the Court decided that
this right, along with the purity of the legislative process and the integrity
of the tax structure, could be preserved only by denying businesses a de-
duction for these expenses. While the tax neutrality premise did not en-
sure that all points of view would be accorded equal consideration, it
guaranteed that presentation of one would not be subsidized at the expense
of any other. Cammarano was thus correctly distinguishable from Speiser
and Grosean because, although its denial of a deduction might inhibit first
amendment speech, the denial was not discriminatory.
B. Development of the Statutory Framework
In the wake of the Cammarano decision, the IRS instituted a program of
vigorous enforcement of the lobbying regulations, including revision of the
regulations to incorporate the novel aspects of Cammarano. 83 For the
79. 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring).
80. Id See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 578 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
250 (1935).
81. 358 U.S. at 515-16 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U.S. 203 (1947)).
82. It is important to remember that the regulation interpreted in Cammarano disal-
lowed deductions for expenditures for appearances before and submissions to Congress and
other legislatures as well as expenditures incurred to influence the public.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c), T.D. 6435, 1960-1 C.B. 79 (1960). This regulation was a
revision of a regulation originally proposed in 1956, but withdrawn after a storm of protest.
Weaver, Taxes and Lobbying-Delning the issue, 48 A.B.A. J. 485 (1962).
For cases following Cammarano, see Barkett v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 126 (1959) (tax-
[Vol. 28:313
Influencing the Public
most part, the revision did little to clarify existing law. The indefinite
terms "lobbying" and "promotion or defeat of legislation" were retained,
but "propaganda" was limited only to propaganda related to those two
proscribed activities. The new regulation allowed deductions for "institu-
tional advertising" but provided no definitional guidelines. In addition,
ambiguous rules were added concerning the deductibility of dues paid to
trade associations. Dues were deductible in full, provided that a "substan-
tial part" of the organization's activities did not constitute "lobbying".
When "substantial lobbying" took place, however, the taxpayer was al-
lowed to deduct only that portion of the dues attributable to other activi-
ties.84 The burden of proof as to the allocation was placed on the
taxpayer.85
Before the enforcement program could be fully developed, Congress
passed the Revenue Act of 1962, adding section 162(e) as the first legisla-
tive pronouncement on the issue of lobbying expense deductions. This sec-
tion completely upset the tax equilibrium policy by allowing a business
expense deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in con-
nection with direct lobbying.8 6 Congress lifted the ban on deductibility of
these lobbying activities in order to create a parity with expenses incurred
in communications with the executive branch and in litigation before the
payer not entitled to deduct membership assessment to Atlanta Retail Liquor Association
because he failed to meet burden of proof that no substantial part of the Association's activi-
ties were to carry on propaganda or otherwise attempt to influence legislation); and Wash-
burn v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1003, aff'd, 283 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1960) (newspaper editor's
expenses in circulating petition to refer state sales tax act to a referendum vote not deducti-
ble as a business expense).
84. Compare this de minimis rule with the all or nothing approach taken by the Tax
Court in McClintock-Trunkey Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 297 (1952), rep'd on other
grounds, 217 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1954).
85. Deduction of special assessments collected specifically for lobbying purposes was
also disallowed. Treas. Reg. § 1. 162(c)(2) (1960).
86. I.R.C. § 162 (e)(1). The full text of the section reads:
(1) IN GENERAL.-The deduction allowed by subsection (a) shall include all
the ordinary and necessary expenses (including, but not limited to, traveling ex-
penses described in subsection (a)(2) and the cost of preparing testimony) paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business-
(A) in direct connection with appearances before, submission of statements to,
or sending communications to, the committees, or individual members, of Con-
gress or of any legislative body of a State, a possession of the United States, or a
political subidivision of any of the foregoing with respect to legislation or proposed
legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer, or
(B) in direct connection with communication of information between the tax-
payer and an organization of which he is a member with respect to legislation or
proposed legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer and to such organization, and
that portion of the dues so paid or incurred with respect to any organization of
which the taxpayer is a member which is attributable to the expenses of the activi-
ties described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) carried on by such organization.
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judicial branch, both of which were deductible.87 The House Ways and
Means Committee Report stated that the prior rule might have discour-
aged businessmen from passing on to legislators information concerning
the impact of present or proposed laws on their businesses, information
essential to the proper evaluation of any legislation. The Committee fur-
ther stated that such a deduction was necessary to determine real income
for tax purposes because direct lobbying activities could be essential to a
business' survival.88 Thus, to some extent, Congress intended section
162(e)(2)(A) to limit the applicability of Cammarano.
This congressional endorsement of a lobbying subsidy was significant in
light of the legislature's familiarity with the less savory aspects of the insti-
tution. Traditionally, lobbying has been associated more with self-interest
than with the public weal. Lobbying operates with such secrecy as to make
it difficult to oppose the sponsor's point of view, and persuades through
personal appeal rather than by a convincing demonstration of the merits.89
Prior congressional response to lobbying had evinced displeasure with
these characteristics: Congress had initiated several investigations into
lobbying, all of which were critical,90 and had enacted legislation requiring
disclosure and periodic reports by lobbyists.9'
Further analysis of the legislative history of section 162(e), however,
provides at least limited insight to Congress' changed attitude toward lob-
bying. The original House bill preserved the tax neutrality policy. The
provision allowing deduction of direct lobbying expenses was added by the
House Ways and Means Committee for the reasons presented in its re-
port, 92 but in the Senate, Senator Douglas trenchantly criticized the depar-
ture from the neutrality premise as an unwarranted tax reduction,
provided where least needed.93 In his opinion, the discrimination between
business and nonbusiness lobbying expenses was impossible to justify be-
87. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17 (1962).
88. H. R. Rep. No. 1447 at 16.
89. See Weaver, supra note 22 at 946.
90. K. SCHRIFTGIESSER, THE LOBBYISTS, chs. III-V (1951) describes early investiga-
tions.
91. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, ch. 753, §§ 302-311, 60 Stat. 839 (1946) (codi-
fied at 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1976)).
92. See text accompanying notes 87 and 88, supra. The bill was then passed by the
House under a closed rule which prohibited amendments and allowed a vote only for or
against the bill as a whole, thus foreclosing significant debate on the amendment. 108
CONG. REC. 5433 (1962). See also 108 CONG. REC. 18486-87 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Doug-
las).
93. 108 CONG. REC. 17768 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Douglas). Douglas also criticized
the language of the section, describing it as full of "ambiguities which will create continuing
uncertainty as to its exact meaning..." Id.
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cause there was no evidence that the tax neutrality rule deterred business
taxpayers from lobbying. Such discrimination was made even less attrac-
tive by the fact that preferential treatment magnified as the amounts spent
for lobbying increased.
In spite of these arguments for the maintenance of tax neutrality, Con-
gress voted to endorse the lobbying subsidy.94 In this action, Congress
may have intended to establish a different type of neutrality: since the gov-
ernment, as the nation's largest lobbyist, used the taxpayer's money to ad-
vocate legislation harmful to particular businesses, equity demanded that
business funds used in advocating the opposing position be deductible. 95
Congress also found it desirable to afford small businesses, for whom non-
deductibility of lobbying expenses was a genuine hardship, a better oppor-
tunity to present their views.
96
Despite this generally indulgent attitude, the Senate rejected a provision
of the bill that allowed a business deduction for expenses incurred as a
result of communications with employees or stockholders about legislation
of direct interest to the business. 97 The provision had been adopted by the
Senate Finance Committee after a proposed extension of deductibility for
communications to the general public was rejected. 98 The Committee had
concluded that such communications to shareholders and employees were
vital to businesses and therefore should be deducted as an ordinary and
necessary business expense.99 During the floor debates, Senator Proxmire
stated that the motion to strike the provision raised the question of why it
would be a necessary expense to tell shareholders or employees about pro-
posed legislation unless the business wished them to put pressure on a leg-
94. The Senate amendment to strike section 3 (section 162(e)(1)(A) from the bill was
defeated 51-13. 108 CONG. REc. 18498 (1962)). It appears that the lack of statutory author-
ity for the neutrality premise, its inapplicability to lobbying before executive agencies, and
business' general success in actually deducting these costs through ignorance of the rules,
indifference to them, or inadequate recordkeeping were the decisive considerations. See 108
CONG. REC. 18486-87 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Douglas); and Weaver, supra note 22, at 952.
95. Webster, Expenses with Respect to Legislative Matters, 48 A.B.A.J. 774 (1962). It is
interesting to note that both the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations opposed the
measure. 108 CONG. REc. 17768 (1962) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
96. 108 CONG. REC. 18491 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Bush).
97. 108 CONG. REc. 18496 (1962). The rejected amendment would have allowed de-
ductions "[i]n direct connection with communication of information between the taxpayer
and an employee or stockholder with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct
interest to the taxpayer." 108 CONG. REc. 18491 (1962).
98. Prior to consideration of H.R. 10650, Congress had reviewed three bills that would
have made the cost of all efforts to influence legislation-except political contributions-tax
deductible. In the second session of the 86th Congress, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee reported favorably H.R. 2173. H.R. 610 and H.R. 6101, submitted in the 87th Con-
gress, were never reported from committee. Weaver, supra note 22, at 952.
99. 108 CONG. REc. 18491 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Curtis).
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islature to take particular action.'0° By rejecting the amendment,' 0 ' the
Senate appears to have concluded that management's responsibility to
keep stockholders and employees informed of legislation affecting their
business was not of sufficient magnitude to make the cost of such commu-
nications deductible in light of its potential for grassroots lobbying solicita-
tion. 0 2 Moreover, this decision indicates that Congress intended
shareholders and employees to be part of "the general public" for the pur-
poses of section 162(e)(2)(B). It is clear from the section's language that
section 162(e)(2)(B), unchallenged on the floor or in committee, was in-
tended only as a limitation on the changes effected by section 162(e)(1):
(2) Limitation-the provisions of paragraph (1) shall not be
construed as allowing the deduction of any amount paid or in-
curred (whether by way of contribution, gift, or otherwise) -
(A) for participation in, or intervention in, any political cam-
paign on behalf of any candidate for public office, or
(B) in connection with any attempt to influence the general
public, or segments thereof, with respect to legislative matters,
elections, or referendums.
10 3
The primary interpretation advanced for the disparate treatment ac-
corded direct and indirect lobbying expenses turns on the relative sophisti-
cation of their respective audiences. In direct lobbying, money is less
likely to be a decisive factor because Congressmen are presumed to be
familiar with the subtleties of the legislation at hand and aware of the
interests represented. At the grassroots level, however, arguments are
more likely to be oversimplified and directed toward emotions rather than
reason. The sheer volume of propaganda afforded by a larger purse con-
ceivably could make a substantial difference in the public perception of an
issue.
In this context, the House Ways and Means Committee Report'0 4 can be
viewed to imply that Congress, because of its expertise, regarded itself,
rather than the general public, as the appropriate party to be petitioned for
aid in business-related matters. Indeed, the deduction allowance is
designed to encourage businesses to present their views on legislation af-
fecting their interests, which in turn enhances congressional expertise. The
100. Id. at 18494 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
101. This provision (section C) of section 3 was defeated by a vote of 40 to 29. Id. at
18496.
102. Senator Miller opined that such expenses would be deductible under the tax laws
then in effect. He drew a distinction between supplying information to shareholders and
appealing to them to write to their Congressmen concerning particular bills. Id. at 18494.
103. I.R.C. § 162(e)(2).




benefits of the deduction are therefore mutual: the business gets a deduc-
tion because the expenditure is in fact helpful-and therefore "neces-
sary"1 05-- to its business activities, and Congress receives more
information on which to base its decisions. Indirect lobbying does not of-
fer this advantage because businesses solicit only grassroots expression of
their own views. Consequently, Congress does not benefit by receiving ad-
ditional, varied and informative opinions.
Unfortunately, the language of 162(e)(2)(B) provides little clue to the
specific grassroots lobbying activities at which it is aimed. It has, in fact,
lived up to the criticism Senator Douglas leveled at 162(a)(1)'s allowance
of deductions for direct lobbying: the ambiguous language of the provision
has created continuing uncertainty as to its true meaning, and, more im-
portantly, to its relationship to the entire process by which citizens seek to
influence legislation at all levels of government. 10 6 While subsequent reg-
ulations under section 162 have attempted to define the terms "general
public" and "legislative matters," they have by no means succeeded in
clarifying the scope of the section.
C. Administrative and Judicial Interpretations Following Promulgation of
Section 162(e)
The first case of any consequence after the enactment of section 162(e)
was Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. United States. 0 7 Decided in 1963,
the case relied upon Cammarano's interpretation of the regulation, 08
rather than the recently-enacted section 162(e). The Southwestern Electric
Power Company had launched a series of advertisements in its service area
designed to develop a spirit of opposition to a congressionally-approved
plan for construction of a publicly-owned competitor power company.
The ads claimed that government ownership of electric power companies
was contrary to the American system of free business enterprise because it
allowed the government to shift its losses to the taxpayers, and would re-
sult in socialism and eventual government control. 109 The Court of Claims
concluded that since legislation authorizing the federal project had already
been passed, the ads were not aimed primarily at promoting or defeating
105. I.R.C. § 162(a).
106. 108 CONG. REC. 17768 (1962), see note 95 supra.
107. 312 F.2d 437 (Ct. CI. 1963).
108. Treas. Reg. I11, § 29.23(q)-1 (1949) (implementing I.R.C. § 23(a)(I)(A) (1939) al-
lowing deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses). Southwestern Electric in-
volved deficiencies for calendar years 1947-1950. Section 162(e), enacted in 1962, therefore
did not apply.
109. 312 F.2d at 440.
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legislation."10 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the ads were nondeduct-
ible in light of the regulatory language disallowing deductions for expenses
incurred in "the exploitation of propaganda, including advertising other
than trade advertising." "' The fact that Southwestern placed its name at
the bottom of each advertisement did not render the messages "trade ad-
vertising," and, as in Cammarano, the threat of business injury was insuffi-
cient to justify a deduction. 12 During the same tax years, Southwestern's
officers had appeared before congressional subcommittees, urging the re-
jection of funds for use in the federal project and questioning the legality
of the proposed appropriations. The Court of Claims overruled the Com-
missioner's decision concerning the nondeductibility of the expenses in-
curred in making these appearances. The court concluded that a mere
appearance before a legislative committee could not be construed as "lob-
bying", and characterized the appearance contesting the legality of an ap-
propriation as Southwestern's duty.1 13 Thus, Southwestern Electric
established guidelines for the determination of an advertisement's deduct-
ibility and placed significant limitations on the definition of direct lobby-
ing.
Regulation 1.162-15(c), promulgated shortly after Cammarano, 114 added
further guidelines concerning the deductibility of advertisements and trade
association dues. This regulation disallowed business deductions for the
cost of advertising designed to promote or defeat legislation or to influence
the public as to the desirability of proposed legislation, even though the
legislation might directly affect the taxpayer's business.1 5 On the other
hand, it also permitted deductions for the expense of institutional or good-
will advertising designed to keep the taxpayer's name before the public,
provided the expenditures were related to patronage the taxpayer might
reasonably expect in the future. 16 The regulation specifically allowed de-
ductions for the cost of advertisements encouraging contributions to the
Red Cross, the purchase of savings bonds and the like, 117 and for adver-
110. Id. at 444.
111. Id. at 442, Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(q)-I (1949).
112. 312 F.2d at 442.
113. Id. at 444. The Court of Claims also noted that the Regulation of Lobbying Act,
specifically exempts mere appearances before a Committee of Congress from its definition of
lobbying. 2 U.S.C. 267 (1976).
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c), T.D. 6435, 1960-1 C.B. 79 (as amended by T.D. 6819,
1965-1 C.B. 91).
115. For a case relying on this aspect of the regulation, see Pickrick, Inc. v. United
States, 65-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9543 (1965) (jury charged that a deduction for advertisements
purchased by a restaurant owned solely by Lester Maddox should be denied if made for
these purposes).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c)(1) (1960).
117. This "Red Cross" provision concerning goodwill advertising can be traced to the
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tisements presenting views on economic, social and other subjects of a gen-
eral nature unrelated to pending legislation.
The regulation also acknowledged that a corporation might circumvent
the rule by deducting payments to other organizations to conduct grass-
roots lobbying. Consequently, it provided for the full deduction of dues
and other payments to labor unions, trade associations, or similar organi-
zations that otherwise met the requirements of the regulations under sec-
tion 162, unless a significant part of the organization's activities consisted
of grassroots lobbying. If the organization engaged in substantial grass-
roots activities, the member was allowed a deduction only for that portion
of its dues or other payments it clearly could establish were attributable to
the organization's other activities. The regulation required that "all the
facts and circumstances"'"1 8 be considered in order to determine whether
grassroots lobbying constituted a substantial part of an organization's ac-
tivities. Since the total amount of dues would be deductible unless the
recipient organization engaged in "substantial" grassroots lobbying, the
regulation created a significant loophole in the enforcement scheme. A
business legitimately could deduct all dues paid to an organization that
engaged in a small amount of such activities.
The regulation currently in force" 9 contains the same basic language,
but provides further definitional guidance. Under its provisions,
"[legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer" con-
tained in code section 162(e)(1)(A) includes "bills and resolutions intro-
duced by a member of Congress or other legislative action submitted to the
legislative body or to a committee or member of such body."'120 To meet
the direct interest test, the legislation or proposed legislation must reason-
ably be expected to affect the trade or business of the taxpayer.' 21 Al-
though the actual effect on business is irrelevant to this determination,
legislation that has only a remote or speculative effect cannot meet the
requisite criteria.' 22 Legislation qualifies as being of direct interest to a
membership organization if it is of direct interest to the organization itself
Second World War, when many corporations sold all their products directly to the Govern-
ment for the military effort, but published advertisements to keep their names before the
public. Hearings, supra note 4, at 200 (Testimony of Lester G. Fant, III, Attorney, Cohen &
Uretz, Washington, D.C.).
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c)(2), T.D. 6435, 1960-1 C.B. 79.
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20; T.D. 6819, 1965-1 C.B. 91, as amendedby T.D. 6996, 1969-1
C.B. 88. The provision regarding "institutional" or "good-will" advertising is contained in
§ 1. 162-20(a)(2). The "substantial part" rule concerning deductibility of dues is contained in
§ 1.162-20(c)(3).
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(2)(ii)(a) (1965).
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(2)(ii)(b)(1)(i) (1965).
122. Id.
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or to one or more of its members. ' 23 For example, the regulation considers
legislation that would improve community services to be of direct interest
to local employers because the improvements would make the community
more attractive to prospective employees. 24 On the other hand, presenta-
tions to Congress opposing a bill on the ground that its passage would
prevent reduction of federal taxes would have too speculative an effect to
warrant a deduction. 25 The regulation is thus both reasonable and clear
in defining which direct lobbying activities are sufficiently "ordinary and
necessary" to the management of a business to merit a deduction under
162(e)(1)(A).
126
In defining nondeductible grassroots lobbying activities, however, the
regulation adds nothing to the limited guidance provided by the Internal
Revenue Code itself. The treasury regulation merely disallows deductions
under section 162(a) for any amounts expended to influence the general
public, or segments thereof, with respect to legislative matters, elections, or
referendums. 27 In addition, it specifies that no deductions shall be al-
lowed for expenses incurred in connection with grassroots campaigns to
encourage the public to contact legislators for the purpose of expressing an
opinion on legislation. 
28
The regulation applies the direct interest test' 29 to dues payments to or-
ganizations, and permits the deduction of the portion of such dues paid for
direct lobbying activities. Part of the regulation retains almost verbatim,
however, the ambiguous "substantial part" test of the 1960 regulation,
30
which took "all the facts and circumstances" into account when determin-
ing whether a substantial part of an organization's activities consisted of
grassroots lobbying.13' At one time, the Secretary of the Treasury indi-
cated that a five percent test would be used in measuring substantiality,
32
but did not specify whether the test would apply to man-hours, dollar ex-
penditures, or some other base.133 More recently, IRS field personnel have
123. Id.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(2)(ii)(b)(l)(ii) (1965).
125. Id.
126. The regulation is equally reasonable and clear in its application to appearances by
expert witnesses and self-employed individuals. Treas. Reg. § 1. 162-20(c)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (1965).
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(4) (1965). The regulation disallows deduction of amounts
expended through contributions, gifts, and other means.
128. Id.
129. See text accompanying note 120, supra.
130. See text accompanying note 118, supra.
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(3) (1965).
132. Hearings on H. A. 10650 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
10, at 4365-66 (1962).
133. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 824.
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employed a fifteen percent test to determine substantiality. 34
IRS enforcement of these current regulations has been minimal 35 and
has provided little aid to their interpretation. In Consumers Power Com-
pany v. United States, the only reported circuit court case applying the
regulations, 36 the Sixth Circuit did no more than reaffirm Southwestern
Electric's principle that corporate political propaganda is nondeduct-
ible,' 37 disallowing advertising costs although no legislation was pending.
In Consumers Power, Consumers, an electric utility company, had paid the
Electric Companies Advertising Program its pro rata share of the cost of a
national advertising campaign. The purpose of the campaign was two-
fold: to explain how electricity could make living more comfortable, and to
point out the negative features of publicly-owned power companies as
compared to privately-owned utilities. The district court disallowed de-
ductions only for the latter category, rejecting Consumer's argument that
only the portion of advertising costs proportionate to the total number of
words attacking public power should be disallowed.' 38 The court stated
that such an interpretation would contravene the regulation, which did not
authorize a "cutting and pasting job" on computations of lobbying ex-
penditures.' 39 Without discussing this issue, the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
disallowed the advertisements, and deferred to the district court's judg-
ment regarding borderline advertisements. 40 The circuit court did discuss
the regulation's limitations, however, stating that the regulation could not
be used to disallow deductions for the costs of competitive message adver-
tisements in a situation where no legislation was pending and a company's
chief competitor was governmentally owned. 4
134. See Audit Survey of "Grassroots" Lobbying and Certain Other Activities Conducted by
LR.C 501(c)(4) and (c)(6) Organizations, I.R.M. Supp. 7(10)G-26/4(11)G-57 § 6.05 (Feb. 3,
1978). The 15% test was established in I.R.M. 4(1 1)93:5(a)&(b). See generally Krebs, Grass-
roots Lobbying Defined- The Scope of the Internal Revenue Code Section 162(e)(2)(B), 56
TAXES 516 (1978).
135. See generally Hearings, supra note 4, at 204 & 210-29 (statements of Lester G. Fant,
III, Attorney, Cohen & Uretz, Washington, D.C. and Victor L. Lowe, Director, General
Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
136. 427 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). W. K. Coors, 60 T.C.
368, 409 (1973), applied the regulation to disallow deductions for "dues and subscriptions"
paid to organizations whose purpose the IRS had determined to be to influence legislation.
Since Coors introduced no evidence on the issue, the Tax Court sustained the IRS determi-
nation. The case does not discuss the type of activities that resulted in the disallowance.
137. See text accompanying notes 110-111, supra.
138. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 299 F.Supp. 1180, 1183 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
139. Id. at 1183-84.
140. 427 F.2d 78, 79 (6th Cir. 1970).
141. Id. at 79-80.
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II. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN AND THE IRS' RESPONSE
The minimal enforcement of section 162(e)(2)(B) by the IRS came to
congressional attention in the early 1970's. The first comprehensive in-
quiry into the Service's practices regarding grassroots advertising arose in
1974 as a result of hearings conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on the
Environment. The subcommittee investigated corporate advertising on en-
ergy and environmental issues and the manner in which such advertise-
ments were subsidized through illegal tax deductions.' 42 A review of
advertisements submitted to the subcommittee prompted the late Senator
Hart, then Chairman, to write to IRS Commissioner Alexander, requesting
a description of existing audit procedures for determining the deductibility
of advertising expenditures under section 162(e)(2). Senator Hart also was
interested in the extent to which that section had been used to disallow
advertising expense deductions over the past five years. Hart inquired
whether the IRS found any ambiguity in the current section 162(e)(2) or
the regulations thereunder regarding the criteria for deductibility, and re-
quested comment on the tax status of contributions to trade associations
made during 1973.'
43
Commissioner Alexander replied that because the IRS cannot reveal
confidential tax information, 44 he was unable to discuss the deductibility
of the advertisements before the subcommittee. His response closely re-
flected the regulations when he stated that the determination of deductibil-
ity requires "an examination of all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the expenditures involved, and must, of necessity, be made on
a case-by-case basis.' 145 The Commissioner cited Revenue Ruling 74-
407,146 which disallows deductions for grassroots lobbying communica-
tions to shareholders, as representative of the principles involved in adver-
tising deductions. As to auditing procedures, Alexander stated that regular
procedures were used and that there were no specific guidelines for adver-
tising expenses. The Commissioner could not answer Hart's inquiry as to
the extent of violations of section 162(e)(2) because the IRS had not main-
tained detailed statistical information providing such data. Alexander felt,
142. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
143. Letter from Senator Philip Hart, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Environment, to
Donald Alexander, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Sept. 13, 1974), reprinted in
Hearings, supra note 4, at 161-62.
144. This prohibition is codified in I.R.C. §§ 6103 & 7213, and in 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976
& Supp. 11 1978).
145. Letter from Donald Alexander, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, to Sena-
tor Philip Hart (Nov. 15, 1974), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at 1635. See text accom-
panying notes 118 & 130, supra.
146. Rev. Rul. 74-407, 1974-2 C.B. 45 discussed at text accompanying note 164, infra.
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however, that neither section 162(e)(2) nor the associated regulations were
ambiguous.' 47 While the Commissioner's "cavalier rejection" of any need
for reform was disconcerting in view of the problems discovered during
Senator Hart's hearings, Alexander's decision to send the advertisements
in question to district directors for their evaluation indicated the possibility
of improved enforcement.
148
At about the same time as the Hart inquiry, Senator Stevenson re-
quested the United States General Accounting Office [GAO] to review the
auditing procedures used by the IRS and the Federal Power Commission
[FPC] in evaluating "political advertising."1 49 Three years passed before
the results of GAO's investigation were publicly announced. 150 The GAO
found that the FPC consistently had allowed improper cost allocations
with respect to political advertising, and its findings regarding the IRS
were even more troubling. Like Senator Hart, the GAO encountered the
Service's refusal to grant access to audit reports, which handicapped a re-
view of IRS administration of 162(e)(2)(B). The GAO did conclude, how-
ever, that the instructions provided by the IRS furnished little guidance to
aid auditors in evaluating the political nature of advertisements. 15
Subsequent to the GAO's report, the House Subcommittee on Com-
merce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs wrote to the IRS to inquire
whether the Service had examined the advertisements submitted by Sena-
tor Hart and had reached any conclusions as to their deductibility. The
IRS reported that out of the ninety-nine ads it had forwarded to field of-
fices as a result of the Hart inquiry, only four, totalling $133,000, had been
disallowed by the Service. The remaining advertisements either had been
found allowable or had not yet been evaluated. 152 Thus, nearly four years
after the initial Hart inquiry, the IRS had not completed its investigation.
On August 2, 1977, the subcommittee also sent a letter of inquiry to 467
large American corporations requesting information about their "repre-
sentational activities," defined as "activities to influence legislation, ad-
147. Letter of Donald Alexander, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at 165.
148. Hearings, supra note 4, at 69 (statement of Harvey J. Shulman, Executive Director,
Media Access Project).
149. This term was defined to include advertising that would be nondeductible under
section 162(e)(2)(B) and/or a "below the line" expense under Account 426.4 of the FPC's
Uniform System of Accounts. 16 U.S.C. § 825 (1976).
150. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 71 n.1 (citing Comptroller General of the United
States, "Auditing of Political Advertising by Electric Utilities and Gas and Oil Companies"
(1976)). Although the GAO dated the report July 16, 1976, it was not publicly released until
late 1977.
151. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 71-72 (statement of Harvey J. Shulman, Executive
Director, Media Access Project) for a more detailed discussion of GAO's findings.
152. Id. at 166 (Appendix D).
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ministrative decision-making and public opinion on public policy
issues."' 53 This inquiry attempted to ascertain the dollar amounts spent by
the companies on these activities in 1976 and part of 1977; whether the
companies belong to trade associations that engaged in such activities and,
if so, what portion of their trade association dues were included as part of
their own lobbying expenses for tax purposes.
154
The Congressional Research Service analyzed the responses and con-
cluded that the companies may have experienced difficulty in complying
with section 162(e)(2) and the corresponding regulations. 155 While this
conclusion may be valid, it must be considered in light of the subcommit-
tee's definition of "representational activities,"'5 -6 a definition that is
broader than the nondeductible activities enumerated in section
162(e)(2)(B). A more accurate conclusion therefore might be that the com-
panies did not employ recordkeeping methods that would facilitate re-
sponse to the subcommittee's inquiry.
157
The GAO, as a result of the subcommittee's interest, reexamined IRS
guidance in this area to determine whether the Service had made any
changes since the GAO had completed its 1976 inquiry. Since the IRS'
audit technique handbook remained unchanged, the GAO subsequently
recommended that the Service clarify its existing regulations to provide
taxpayers and auditors with better definitions for classifying grassroots
lobbying expenses for tax purposes. In addition, the GAO suggested that
the IRS systematically test the advertising and lobbying practices followed
by various industries to determine the extent of noncompliance and the
need for corrective action.'
58
153. Hearings, supra note 4, at 458 (statement of Suzanne Laurencell, Analyst for Con-
gressional Research Service). The inquiry was addressed to five categories of companies: (1)
Fortune 500 companies; (2) banks; (3) gas and electric companies; (4) transportation compa-
nies; and (5) miscellaneous.
154. Id. at 459. Only 268 (57%) of the companies replied, 98 merely in a pro forma
fashion.
155. Congressional Research Service attributed this difficulty to inadequate record keep-
ing practices, confusion concerning the types of activities considered grassroots lobbying,
and a lack of awareness of trade association activities. Id. at 460.
156. See text accompanying note 153, supra.
157. Hearings, supra note 4, at 463 (statement of Rogelio Garcia, analyst for Congres-
sional Research Service). Some respondents did, however, indicate specifically that they
kept no separate account for grassroots lobbying activities. Id. at 462. Twenty companies
also demonstrated confusion concerning the meaning of grassroots lobbying by stating that
they did not engage in such activities, but providing information that indicated that they did.
Id. at 463.
158. The GAO also recommended that the IRS provide its agents with more specific
audit criteria, including a listing of advertising themes, for use in segregating grassroots
lobbying expenses from allowable deductions. Letter from Richard L. Fogel, Associate Di-
rector, General Government Division, Tax Group, U.S. General Accounting Office, to Je-
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In response to this pressure, the IRS has taken several steps to clarify the
rules governing grassroots lobbying expenditures for tax purposes. On
February 3, 1978, the Service amended its field manual to abolish the
fifteen percent test used to determine whether a trade association engages
in substantial grassroots lobbying. 159 Important factors that examiners
will now consider in auditing tax-exempt organizations 60 include the per-
centage of nondeductible expenditures, the dollar level of those expendi-
tures, and the tax consequences to the individual members. Whenever a
proposed adjustment will result in a material tax change to the individual
member, the IRS may disallow a portion of dues payments, without con-
sidering the percentage of an organization's total expenditures attributable
to nondeductible grassroots activities. As in the regulations, special assess-
ments for these activities are not subject to allocation but are nondeduct-
ible in full.
16 1
The IRS further demonstrated its intent to improve the enforcement of
section 162(e)(2)(B) by issuing four revenue rulings 62 that clarify many of
the ambiguities present in the regulations. Revenue Ruling 78-111 states
rome Kurtz, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, (Nov. 9, 1977), reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 4, at 230.
159. Audit Survey of "Grassroots" Lobbying and Certain Other Activities Conducted by
IRC 501(c)(5) and (c)(6) Organizations, I.R.M. Supp. 7(10)G-26/4(l I)G-57 § 6.05 (Feb. 3,
1978). The IRS stated that the purpose of the substantiality requirement was not to provide
a safe harbor for grassroots activities, but to preclude de minimis assessments on individual
members of an organization.
160. Real estate boards, boards of trade, business leagues, chambers of commerce and
the like are tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). Labor, agricultural, and horticultural orga-
nizations are tax exempt under § 501(c)(5). These are the two categories of membership
organizations that would render their dues nondeductible under Treas. Reg. § 1. 162-20(c)(4)
(1965, as amended 1969) by engaging in grassroots lobbying. Both § 501(c)(5) and (c)(6)
organizations may engage in any amount of legislative activity without losing their exempt
status. Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117.
161. I.R.M. Supp. 7(10)G-26/4(1 1)G-57 § 6.05 (Feb. 3, 1978). The IRS also announced
as goals for fiscal 1978 mandatory audits for at least two labor unions of varying size per
district and at least five percent of the section 501(c)(6) filers in each district, focusing prima-
rily on those with budgets of $500,000 or greater. Id. at §§ 2.04 & 4.04. See Krebs, supra
note 134, at 518 for a discussion of the new substantiality standards.
In view of IRS' failure to prosecute violations of section 162(e)(2)(B) (see Hearings, supra
note 4, at 240 (statement of Lester G. Fant, III, Attorney, Cohen and Uretz, Washington,
D.C.)), this directive to step up enforcement is long overdue. Abolition of the 15% test for
substantiality is welcome because it eliminates a loophole. While the new tests employing
the percentage of nondeductible expenditures and their dollar level are obviously reason-
able, the direction to consider disallowance where it would result in a material tax change to
the contributor initially appears unjustified. This provision is necessary, however, because
the disallowance is directed at the member/contributor's deductions-not at the organiza-
tion, which remains tax exempt. The provision thus effectuates the regulation's policy that
the member taxpayer should not be allowed to receive, by means of a contribution, a deduc-
tion that it could not take if it performed grassroots activities on its own.
162. Rev. Ruls. 78-111, 78-112, 78-113 and 78-114, 1978-1 C.B. 41, 42, 43, 44.
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that a corporation may not deduct the costs of printing and distributing to
its shareholders its president's remarks before a state legislature expressing
the corporation's opposition to certain proposed legislation. 163 This ruling
is an expansion of Revenue Ruling 74-407,1 64 promulgated in response to
Senator Hart's inquiry, which disallowed deductions for costs incurred in
distributing to shareholders copies of a pamphlet suggesting that the share-
holders contact their congressmen concerning proposed legislation. Reve-
nue Ruling 74-407 specifically noted that this disallowance was consistent
with the Senate's rejection of the amendment that would have allowed de-
ductions for such communications. 65 Revenue Ruling 78-111, which
states that a corporation may not deduct communications to its sharehold-
ers which express the corporation's views on legislative matters, is signifi-
cant in that it eliminates the requirement that the corporation request the
shareholders to contact their representatives. This decision is realistic in
assuming that shareholders possess sufficient sophistication to heed an in-
ferential request to write to their representatives concerning a measure
harmful to their corporation. To state the opposite would make it possible
for a business to circumvent section 162(e)(2)(B) and Revenue Ruling 74-
407 in their entirety merely by omitting any explicit request to contact leg-
islators. Moreover, Revenue Ruling 78-111 is consistent with congres-
sional intent to preclude a deduction for communication of information
between a corporation and its employees and stockholders regarding pend-
ing or proposed legislation of direct interest to the corporation.
166
Revenue Ruling 78-112 concerns nondeductible advertising expenses.
In this decision, the IRS ruled that it is unnecessary for an advertisement
to request explicitly the general public or a segment thereof to contact their
representatives to invoke the sanctions of section 162(e)(2)(B). As long as
an advertisement attempts to develop-through words, pictures, or any
163. The legislation at issue in the ruling would have required manufacturing companies
to meet new antipollution guidelines. The president's remarks set forth recommendations
for an alternative program, and noted that if the proposed bill were passed, the corporation
would have to incur substantial capital expenditures to meet the new guidelines. Id. at 7.
164. Rev. Rul. 74-407, 1974-2 C.B. 45.
165. 108 CONG. REC. 18491 (1962). See discussion at text accompanying notes 97-102,
supra.
166. It is worthy of note that both the House and Senate versions of the lobbying reform
bill would require registration only of lobbying solicitations that explicitly request the recipi-
ents to contact their representatives. H.R. 8494, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(a)(7) (1978); S.
2971, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. § 6(b)(5) (1978). See also Rev. Rul78-111, 1978-1 C.B. 41. While
efficiency may dictate that this is a reasonable place to draw the line for registration pur-
poses, the tax law is aimed at preventing subsidization of communications that have a grass-
roots lobbying effect. Thus for tax purposes the absence of a specific request to contact




other means-a grassroots point of view by influencing public opinion on
legislation, its costs will be nondeductible. 167 Since section 162(e)(2)(B)
specifically disallows deductions in connection with any attempt to influ-
ence the general public, however, this ruling adds nothing to enlarge the
scope of nondeductible grassroots expenditures. Instead, the ruling indi-
cates that the focus of the IRS' analysis will not be limited to the words of
a message but will examine its impact as a whole. This alerts corporations
to observe carefully the minor differences distinguishing a deductible good
will advertisement from a nondeductible grassroots lobbying message.
68
Since these differences are neither statutorily nor administratively defined,
the effect of Revenue Ruling 78-112 is an in terrorem one. The ruling thus
suggests that an advertisement that on its face may appear to be a deducti-
ble general social or economic comment may be a nondeductible grass-
roots lobbying solicitation if published at a time when arguably related
legislation is under consideration.
69
167. The taxpayer, a residential land developer, had placed an advertisement in all ma-
jor state newspapers that set forth its objections to a proposed bill regarding land use plan-
ning and suggested what it considered a more workable plan. Rev. Rul. 78-112, 1978-1 C.B.
42.
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (1965) allows deductions for messages of general public
interest. See notes 117 & 119, supra and accompanying text.
169. The following Pennwalt Corporation advertisement, published in the May 1, 1976
issue of Forbes Magazine, is an example of this situation:
The Modem Little Red Hen
Once upon a time, there was a little red hen who scratched about the barnyard
until she uncovered some grains of wheat. She called her neighbors and said, "If
we plant this wheat, we shall have bread to eat. Who will help me plant it?"
"Not I," said the cow.
"Not I," said the duck.
"Not I," said the pig.
"Not I,' said the goose.
"Then I will," said the little red hen. And she did. The wheat grew tall and
ripened into golden grain. "Who will help me reap my wheat?" asked the little red
hen.
"Not I," said the duck.
"Out of my classification," said the pig.
"I'd lose my seniority," said the cow.
"I'd lose my unemployment compensation," said the goose.
"Then I will," said the little red hen, and she did.
At last it came time to take the bread. "Who will help me bake the bread?"
asked the little red hen.
"That would be overtime for me," said the cow.
"I'd lose my welfare benefits," said the duck.
"I'm a dropout and never learned how," said the pig.
"If I'm to be the only helper, that's discrimination," said the goose.
"Then I will," said the little red hen.
She baked five loaves and held them up for her neighbors to see.
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The third ruling, Revenue Ruling 78-113, defines nondeductible trade
association lobbying activities. In this ruling, the IRS sets forth the general
rule that the employees and customers of members of the trade association
constitute a "segment" of the general public for section 162(e)(2)(B) pur-
poses.' 70 Thus, if a communication from a trade association is intended to
go beyond its members and is either directly, or through the membership,
aimed at employees or customers of members, it will constitute grassroots
lobbying. This ruling, along with the abolition of the fifteen percent test
for determining substantiality,' 7' will deter organization members from
circumventing section 162(e)(2)(B) by prohibiting deductions for organiza-
tion activities that would be disallowed were the members performing the
activities directly. No problem is presented by the disallowance for com-
munications to the members' customers since the customer is clearly not
part of the organization. Difficulty arises, however, in separating organiza-
tion members from their employees.' 72 Membership organizations specifi-
They all wanted some and, in fact, demanded a share. But the little red hen said,
"No, I can eat the five loaves myself."
"Excess profits!" cried the cow.
"Capitalist leech!" screamed the duck.
"I demand equal rights!" yelled the goose.
And the pig just grunted. And they painted "unfair" picket signs and marched
round and round the little red hen, shouting obscenities.
When the government agent came, he said to the little red hen, "You must not
be greedy."
"But I earned the bread," said the little red hen.
"Exactly," said the agent. "That is the wonderful free enterprise system. Any-
one in the barnyard can earn as much as he wants. But under our modern govern-
ment regulations, the productive workers must divide their product with the idle."
And they lived happily ever after, including the little red hen, who smiled and
clucked, "I am grateful, I am grateful."
But her neightbors wondered why she never again baked any more bread.
Despite its general nature, the advertisement may be considered grassroots lobbying be-
cause it appeared while the "Sunset for Regulations" bill was a legislative matter. See
Hearings, supra note 4, at 206, App. (Statement of Lester G. Fant, III, Attorney, Cohen &
Uretz, Washington, D.C.). The advertisement also addressed the profits issue, a key concern
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, while that legislation was pending. Id. at 135 (statement of
Harvey J. Shulman, Executive Director, Media Access Project).
170. A section 501(c)(6) tax exempt trade association had taken a strong stand before the
legislature opposing a new timetable for implementation of occupational safety standards.
The association had contacted its members to urge them to ask their employees and custom-
ers to write to state legislators in support of the repeal of the timetable. Rev. Rul. 78-113,
1978-1 C.B. 43.
171. I.R.M. Supp. 7(10)G-26/4(I 1)G-57 § 6.05 (Feb. 3, 1978), discussed at text accompa-
nying notes 159-61, supra.
172. With respect to this problem, an analogy may be drawn to the Federal Election
Campaign Act. Section 44lb(a) of the Act makes it illegal for any national bank or any
corporation organized by authority of a law of Congress to make any contribution or expen-
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cally are allowed to deduct such communications to their members under
section 162(e)(1)(B). 173 Revenue Ruling 78-113's disallowance for indirect
solicitation of the members' employees, however, seems in keeping with
the congressional intent manifested by rejection of the proposed allowance
for a corporation's communications to its employees and stockholders.'
74
Revenue Ruling 78-114 addresses a similar issue, stating that although a
tax-exempt trade association that contacts its members urging them to
write to their congressmen in support of legislation of direct interest to the
association is not engaged in grassroots lobbying, similar communication
to prospective members is a nondeductible grassroots activity. The ration-
ale for the different treatment is that communications to prospective mem-
bers, who may or may not subsequently join the organization, must be
considered directed at the general public.
These recent actions demonstrate that the IRS has recognized the subtle
enforcement problems presented by the grassroots lobbying disallowance.
Abolition of the fifteen percent test for substantial lobbying closes a loop-
hole and allows trade association activities to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. The revenue rulings close other loopholes by announcing the
standards to be applied to the solicitation of shareholders, customers, and
employees. In addition, the rulings make clear that IRS scrutiny will not
be confined to the language of the message at issue. When considered to-
gether, these new rules indicate that future IRS policy will be to apply
section 162(e)(2)(B) more strictly to a broader range of activities.
diture in connection with an election to any political office. Section 441b(b)(2) defines
"contribution or expenditure" to include direct or indirect payments, loans, advances or gifts
of money, or any services, or anything of value, but specifically excludes "communications
by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their
families on any subject...." "Executive or administrative personnel" is defined as "indi-
viduals employed by a corporation who are paid on a salary, rather than hourly, basis and
who have policymaking, managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibilities." 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(7) (1976). This definition may reasonably be employed in applying Revenue Ruling
78-113 as a test for determining which personnel of a trade association member constitute
the "member" and which constitute "employees." Id.
173. Section 162(e)(I)(B) states that a corporation may deduct as an ordinary and neces-
sary businessexpense its expenditures paid or incurred:
(B) in direct connection with communication of information between the tax-
payer and an organization of which he is a member with respect to legislation or
proposed legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer and to such organiza-
tion. . . , I.R.C. § 162(e)(I)(B).
The House Report in connection with the enactment of this section stated that "[t]his
communication may be either from the organization to the taxpayer or vice versa." H.R.
REP. No. 1147, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405, 422.
174. See text accompanying notes 97-102 & 165, supra.
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III. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS' CHALLENGE
TO THE REVENUE RULINGS
A. Grounds of the Complaint
On May 16, 1978, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), a
trade association long known for its extensive lobbying activities, 175 filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to
challenge the constitutionality of the four revenue rulings and of section
162(e)(2)(B) under the first and fifth amendments. 76 The NAM also al-
leges that the revenue rulings contradict the terms of section 162(e)(2)(B)
by expanding the category of nondeductible activities beyond those stated
in the statute.
177
The NAM is a tax exempt trade association under section 501(c)(6),178
organized for the purpose of "the promotion of the industrial interests of
the United States."' 79 Treasury Regulation section 1.162-15(c), 180 permits
association members to deduct the dues they pay to the organization.'
8'
The NAM is registered as a lobbying organization and files quarterly lob-
bying reports pursuant to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.'
8 2
Since 162(e)(2)(B) became effective on January 1, 1963, no NAM member
has been disallowed a deduction for any part of its annual dues payment
on account of grassroots lobbying conducted by the NAM organization. 
83
As the NAM is a voluntary association, the deductibility of its dues is im-
portant to businesses' decisions to become and remain members. 184 Thus,
since the NAM engages in lobbying activities that are nondeductible
under the new revenue rulings, the disallowance of dues deductions may
curtail the organization's membership.
The association either has engaged, or has proposed to engage in each of
the various activities that would be nondeductible under the new rul-
175. See K. CRAWFORD, THE PRESSURE Boys 46-50 (1939), describing a history of
intrigue, intimidation, bribery and solicitation by NAM's high pressure lobbyists at the Cap-
itol.
176. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at I, National Ass'n of Mfrs. v.
Blumenthal, No. 78-0874 (D.D.C., filed May 16, 1978). [Hereinafter cited as Complaint].
177. Id. at 10-11.
178. The criteria for exemption under section 501(c)(6) are discussed at note 160, supra.
179. Complaint, supra note 176, at 3.
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1965).
181. According to this regulation, members may deduct all dues paid to organizations
such as labor unions and trade associations subject to substantial grassroots lobbying limita-
tions under Treas. Reg. 1.162-20(c) (1965).
182. 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1976).
183. Complaint, supra note 176, at 5.
184. Id. at 9.
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ings.' 85 It alleges that both section 162(e)(2)(B) and the rulings chill its
exercise of first amendment rights, 186 due to the adverse financial impact
that would result if it were to continue grassroots lobbying activities. In
order to maintain its membership, it will have to keep dues deductible,
which therefore involves refraining from constitutionally protected politi-
cal speech. The NAM further claims that the revenue rulings violate the
due process clause of the fifth amendment by discriminating between the
tax treatment accorded businesses and that accorded tax-exempt charitable
organizations. 8 7 With respect to the Code, the NAM alleges that section
162(e)(2)(B) violates the due process clause by creating a discriminatory
distinction between direct and indirect lobbying, two forms of constitu-
tionally-protected speech.188 Additionally, the NAM argues that the rul-
ings misinterpret the Code by defining "the general public or segments
thereof' to include narrowly defined audiences bearing special relation-
ships to the lobbying party, such as shareholders and employees.
8 9
. The last of these contentions is the most easily answered. As previously
discussed, the Senate's rejection of the amendment allowing deduction of
communications to shareholders and employees is persuasive evidence
that Congress intended these communications to be considered addressed
to "the general public or a segment thereof."' 90 Customers are clearly
members of the general public because their alleged special relationship to
the corporation is so tenuous as to be nonexistent.' 91 The revenue rulings'
determination that grassroots lobbying communications to shareholders,
employees, and customers are nondeductible is therefore consistent with
the terms of section 162(e)(2)(B). The constitutionality of the rulings, as to
185. Id at 8.
186. Id. at 9-10.
187. Id. at 10. New I.R.C. Section 4911 allows charitable organizations exempt from
taxation under section 501(c)(3) to elect to engage in lobbying activities up to a prescribed
percentage of their budgets, without losing exempt status. Up to 25% of the permissible
lobbying expenditures may be spent on grassroots lobbying. If a charity does not so elect, it
will be treated under the old rule, which provides that any charity engaging in "substantial"
lobbying loses its exemption. These provisions are discussed in further detail at text accom-
panying notes 225-39, infra.
188. Complaint, supra note 176, at 10.
189. Id. at 10-11.
190. Senator Douglas' comments in debate on that amendment aptly summarize the ra-
tionale behind the rulings:
The effects of such subsidized efforts to influence legislation indirectly would not
be confined to the recipient members, shareholders, and employees. The views
expressed and their source would frequently come to the attention of families and
friends of the recipients, thereby broadening the scope of the influence subsidized
by the Federal Treasury.
108 CONG. REc. 17768 (1962). See text accompanying notes 97-102 upra.
191. See text accompanying notes 170-74 supra.
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both the first amendment and due process claims, is thus inextricably en-
twined with the constitutionality of section 162(e)(2)(B).
B. The First Amendment Argument-First National Bank of Boston P.
Bellotti
The NAM's contention that section 162(e)(2)(B) and the revenue rulings
chill its exercise of first amendment rights is based upon the Supreme
Court's recent decision of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
92
which extended first amendment protection to the political speech of cor-
porations.
In Bellotti, two national banking associations and three business corpo-
rations challenged a Massachusetts statute prohibiting them from making
contributions or expenditures to influence any referendum votes, except
those materially affecting the property, business, or assets of the corpora-
tion.' 93 The case presented four possible views of Massachusetts' distinc-
tion between direct and indirect corporate lobbying-a distinction parallel
to the provisions of section 162(e) regarding the deductibility of those ac-
tivities.
Conceding that the right of corportions to claim fourteenth amendment
protection for their business and property 94 accorded them some rights of
speech and expression under the first amendment, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts found these limited rights to be co-extensive with
those allowed a corporation by section eight of the Massachusetts stat-
ute-the right to communicate to the general public its position on politi-
cal issues materially affecting its business. 195
On appeal to the Supreme Court, three dissenters, Justice White, joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, endorsed Massachusetts' holding that a
state may impose a direct limitation on the first amendment rights of cor-
porations in order to prevent corporations' inordinate resources from
drowning out the competing first amendment interest of individuals'
speech. Their view, however, was based on the premise that the principal
function of the first amendment is to protect individual self-expression and
192. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
193. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1978). The statute also specified
that "no question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, prop-
erty or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business
or assets of the corporation." A maximum fine of $50,000 was imposed on a corporation
violating section eight, and corporate officers, directors, and agents were subject to max-
imum fines of $10,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year. Id.
194. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 286 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Western Turf Ass'n v.
Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 244
(1906).
195. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney General, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Mass. 1977).
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that this function could be furthered in no way by corporate speech. 196
Thus, Justice White would have found no constitutional violation in Mas-
sachusetts' segregating direct lobbying activities from grassroots activities,
and prohibiting only the latter.
Agreeing with Justice White that Massachusetts had reason to fear that
corporations would use their economic power to unfair political advan-
tage, Justice Rehnquist nevertheless wrote a separate dissent, 197 stating
that a corporation did not possess the right to political expression when
such expression was not necessary for the corporation to carry out the
commercial functions for which it was organized. In his opinion, corpora-
tions had no need to petition the legislature because their property rights
were accorded adequate protection by the judicial branch. Therefore,
Rehnquist would have extended section eight to prohibit corporate direct
lobbying activities as well.
The majority of the Court analyzed the issue from a different perspec-
tive, focusing on the speech itself rather than its source. Whereas the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the four dissenters thought the
principal question was the extent to which corporations possess first
amendment rights, the majority focused upon whether the Massachusetts
law abridged rights that the first amendment was intended to protect. The
majority held that the state law did abridge those rights.198 Reviewing the
history of the first amendment, the Court stated that one of its primary
purposes has been to protect free discussion of matters of public con-
cern.199 The Court found that appellants' expression of their opinion that
enactment of a personal income tax would adversely affect the economy of
the state clearly was guaranteed this protection.2°° Had the speakers in-
volved not been corporations, no one would have suggested that the State
could silence their proposed speech. The fact that the speech came from a
corporation, rather than an individual, made it no less indispensable to
democratic decision-making. The Constitution has always protected the
capacity of speech to inform the public.
20 1
196. 435 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White placed considerable emphasis
on statistics demonstrating that corporate grassroots lobbying expenditures had influenced
significantly the results of state referendums. Id. at 811.
197. Id at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 776.
199. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-
102 (1940).
200. 435 U.S. at 785-86.
201. Id. For an exposition of the "public speech" theory of the First Amendment, see A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1948);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255:
The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak". It protects the free-
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Accordingly, the Court held that by forcing a corporation to restrict its
speech to business-related matters, section eight had effected a constitu-
tionally impermissible limitation on the content of a message. Thus, the
governmental interests asserted by Massachusetts to justify this limitation
could not withstand the strict scrutiny required of state-imposed restric-
tions on free speech. The Court noted that there had been no showing that
corporations exerted an inordinate influence in Massachusetts referendum
votes. 20 2 Additionally, it reasoned that the fact that corporate speech
might have affected the outcome of a vote was irrelevant to the first
amendment issue because the Constitution "protects expression which is
eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing. ' 20 3 Since it is the re-
sponsibility of the citizens to make judgments concerning their govern-
ment, the Constitution must properly place upon them the risk that
information may be misinterpreted. To hold otherwise would be to en-
dorse state paternalism, said the Court.2°
4
By thus adopting the view that both variations of corporate lobbying are
accorded first amendment protection, the Court stated that no direct bans
may be placed on either activity. It neither stated nor implied, however,
that equivalent tax treatment necessarily follows.
C. The Constitutionality of the Tax Provisions in Light of Bellotti
Bellotti's holding that no direct limitations may be imposed on corporate
speech is constitutionally sound and in complete harmony with the Court's
prior decisions. Bellotti, however, is limited only to direct restraints on
corporate expression and does not in any way upset the basic premise of
Cammarano. Cammarano, in fact, seems to have anticipated the Bellotti
holding by twenty years. In stating that corporate expenditures for grass-
roots lobbying are not deductible, Cammarano specifically assumed that
such direct expenditures were constitutionally protected.20 The fact that
dom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern'. It is
concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental re-
sponsibility.
and Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Supreme Court Since New York Times v. Sullivan, 26
SYR. L. REV. 819 (1975) ("The right to speak is subordinate to our need to hear.")
202. 435 U.S. at 789-90. This conclusion was criticized in White's dissent, Id at 810, and
by commentators. See text accompanying notes 215-22 infra.
203. 435 U.S. at 790 (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of the
State of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).
204. "Government is forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people
lose their ability to govern themselves." 435 U.S. at 791, n.31. The Court also noted that
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), rejected the notion that government may restrict the
speech of some citizens in order to enhance the relative voice of others. 435 U.S. at 790-91.
205. 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959). Cammarano did not even suggest that corporate political
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Bellot/i explicitly declared such expenditures to be entitled to first amend-
ment protection in no way augments their claim to deductibility status.
The sixteenth amendment grants Congress the power to tax all income
from whatever source derived, and the corollary discretion to create ex-
emptions and deductions. 2°6 The statutory determination that grassroots
lobbying appeals are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses was thus clearly within congressional authority.
Cammarano's statement that "[p]etitioners are not being denied a tax
deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but
are simply being required to pay for those activities entirely out of their
own pockets ... 207 is therefore as valid today as it was when written.
Now, as then, the constitutional protection accorded first amendment
speech does not entitle that speech to government subsidization. 20 8 It is
only when the taxing power is employed in a discriminatory manner to
create a prior restraint on speech on the basis of content, as in Speiser,
20 9
or on the basis of the speaker's identity, as in Grosean ,210 that the taxing
power collides with, and must yield to, the fundamental rights protected by
the first amendment.
This conclusion is buttressed by the Fourth Circuit's recent opinion in
Taxation with Representation v. United States.21  The plaintiff, a public
interest group organized for the purpose of lobbying on federal tax legisla-
tion, had been denied section 501(c)(3) status as a tax-exempt charitable
organization and the concomitant right to receive contributions deductible
under section 170(c)(2)(D). 21 2 The organization subsequently brought
suit, charging that the lobbying proscription of section 501(c)(3) violates
its rights of free speech and petition under the first amendment and denies
it the equal protection of the law under the fifth amendment. 213 On the
first amendment issue, the Fourth Circuit noted the distinction between
Speiser and Cammarano, holding the former inapposite and stating that
the latter protects the nondiscriminatory deduction disallowance of sec-
expression could be directly restricted, but held only that the costs of that expression could
not be deducted.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, construed in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 20
(1916), and Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
207. 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
208. See Justice Douglas' concurrence in Commarano, discussed at text accompanying
notes 79-81 supra.
209. 357 U.S. 513 (1958); see notes 50-55 and accompanying text, supra.
210. 297 U.S. 233 (1936); see notes 34-42 and accompanying text, supra.
211. Taxation with Representation v. United States, 586 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1978).
212. These sections are discussed at note 229 infra.
213. The equal protection argument presented in Taxation with Representation is dis-
cussed at text accompanying note 238 infra.
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tions 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2)(D). It is thus clear that Cammarano's defini-
tion of the relationship between the first and sixteenth amendments has not
been eroded by subsequent tax cases or by Bellotti.
Indeed, the Bellotti decision itself indicates a need to continue to treat
these grassroots lobbying expenditures as nondeductible. Bellotti regarded
the absence of corruption or undue influence resulting from corporate
speech as an important factor in concluding that the speech was entitled to
first amendment protection:
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful
and their views may drown out other points of view. If appellee's
arguments were supported by record or legislative findings that
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine demo-
cratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First
Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our consider-
ation. 21
4
Similarly, the key factor behind disallowing deductions for corporate
grassroots expenditures has been to prevent corporations from acquiring
such an unfair advantage. Denial of deductibility enhances the first
amendment rights of all by preventing corporate purchasing power from
impeding access to public forums by others. Thus, Internal Revenue Code
section 162(e)(2)(B) represents a constitutionally permissible government
action that addresses Justice White's concern with balancing the compet-
ing first amendment rights of corporations and individuals: the govern-
ment may not deny corporations their right to speak but may refuse to
subsidize the exercise of that right.
This balancing function performed by section 162(e)(2)(B) is particu-
larly significant in light of criticism that regards Bellotti's conclusion that
the relative voice of corporations has not overwhelmed or even signifi-
cantly influenced referendums as naive.215 Although the majority in
Bellotti dismissed as incomplete White's figures purportedly showing that
corporate wealth dominates the electoral process, 216 at least one study has
shown that corporate grassroots lobbying activities have had a significant
influence on the outcome of state-wide referendum votes. 217 This study,
focusing on voter initiatives during 1976, found that measures favored in
public opinion polls early in the initiative campaigns frequently were re-
214. 435 U.S. at 789.
215. Hearings, supra note 4, at 77-78 (statement of Harvey J. Shulman, Executive Direc-
tor, Media Access Project, criticizing Belloit's conclusion that the influence of corporate
political speech has been insignificant, 435 U.S. at 789-90).
216. 435 U.S. at 789 n.28.
217. Hearings, supra note 4, at 256-73 (statement of John S. Shockley, Associate Profes-
sor, Western Illinois University).
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soundingly defeated on election day.2 18 In the cases studied, corporate ef-
forts typically began not long before the election and presented a new
definition of the issue designed to change the voters' opinions,219 at a cost
of up to two-hundred times the amounts expended by public interest
groups sponsoring the referendums. 220 Since the initiatives were not al-
ways defeated, even when opponents outspent proponents, the study did
not conclude that money in and of itself was decisive, but found that when
the corporate viewpoint prevailed, money was clearly a significant fac-
tor.2 2 ' The study's findings indicate that any subsidization provided cor-
porate grassroots lobbying campaigns by tax deductions might subject
corporations to charges of undue influence, which in turn would jeopard-
ize the first amendment protection accorded these activities under
Bellotti.222 Thus, Bellotti does not aid the NAM's argument that section
162(e)(2)(B) and the revenue rulings thereunder are unconstitutional under
the first amendment, but in fact supports the policy behind those tax provi-
sions.
D. The NAM's Equal Protection Argument
The NAM alleges that section 162(e)(2)(B) violates its right to the equal
protection of the laws as guaranteed under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment because it discriminates between different types of consti-
tutionally-protected speech and between different types of speakers.
223
These arguments address the fact that Cammarano's tax neutrality pol-
icy--that all parties should stand on the same footing regarding the
purchase of grassroots publicity-- -224 is no longer the law.
The argument that section 162(e)(2)(B) discriminates between different
218. Id. at 256.
219. Shockley's study focused on initiatives concerning mandatory bottle deposits and
nuclear energy. Regarding nuclear energy safety initiatives, he stated that the energy corpo-
rations consistently charged that the true intent was to ban nuclear power, rather than to
make it safe. Because early polls showed that the public did not want to foreclose nuclear
energy as an option, but merely wished to ensure its safe use, this redefinition became criti-
cal to the outcome of the vote. Similarly, on mandatory deposit initiatives, the opposition
charged that the measure would eliminate the choice of "convenience containers" (not
"throwaways"!), would result in a loss of jobs, and would not alleviate the litter problem.
Id. at 261-62.
220. Id at 258.
221. Id. at 261. "To overcome money, proponents needed unusual counter resources,
such as unusually broad-based coalitions, or the luck of having an opposition which used its
impressive resources poorly, or an issue which could not be easily redefined by the opposi-
tion." Id at 264.
222. See Bellotti's discussion of the integrity of the electoral process at 435 U.S. 765, 788-
92, and text accompanying note 214 supra.
223. Complaint, supra note 176, at 10.
224. 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
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types of speakers is directed at new IRC section 4911 which allows tax
exempt charitable organizations under section 501(c)(3) to retain their tax
exempt status if they engage in limited amounts of lobbying activities, in-
cluding grassroots lobbying.225 Previously, 501(c)(3) organizations would
lose their tax exemptions if they engaged in a "substantial" amount of lob-
bying activities.226 However, neither the IRS nor the courts ever ade-
quately defined "substantial", so that organizations would know how
much lobbying they could engage in without endangering their status.
22 7
Under the old rule, if a charity were found to have violated the "substan-
tial" rule, it would be allowed to retain its exemption by switching to sec-
tion 501(c)(4) status, 228 but would lose the privilege of having its
contributions deductible to contributors.229 Now charities may choose to
continue to be evaluated under the substantial test or elect under section
501(h) 230 to be covered by the new provisions that restrict their legislative
activities to a percentage of the organization's expenditures for exemption
purposes. As these expenditures increase, the percentage allowed for legis-
lative activities declines, but in no event may more than one-fourth of this
allowable lobbying percentage be spent on grassroots activities.23'
Under section 4911, grassroots expenditures are defined as any attempt
to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the
225. I.R.C. § 4911 (added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 1307(b), 90 Stat. 1520).
226. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
227. For an analysis of the history and interpretation of the "substantial" test, see Caplin
and Timbie, Legislative Activities of Public Charities, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. No. 4,
183 (1975).
228. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)-"Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but op-
erated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the
membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a
particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable,
educational, or recreational purposes." These organizations are not subject to the substan-
tial lobbying limitation.
229. Section 501(c)(3) status is important to maintain because only contributions to
501(c)(3) organizations are deductible to contributors under section 170. I.R.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(D).
230. I.R.C. § 501(h)(3). Subsection (h) was added to section 501 by the 1976 Tax Reform
Act to implement the provisions of § 4911.
231. Two penalties are imposed on electing charities whose expenditures exceed these
guidelines: expenditures beyond either the general or grassroots limit are taxed at 25% of the
excess (§ 491 l(a)(l)); when a charity has expended 150% of the limits on a four year average,
loss of section 501(c)(3) status is imposed (§ 501(h)(2)(B) and (D)). Neither electing nor
nonelecting charities are allowed to transfer to section 501(c)(4) status upon losing a
501(c)(3) exemption. I.R.C. § 491 1(c). See H.R. REP. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
Washburn, New Tax Act Dejines "Substantial" Lobbying - But Charities Must Elect to be
Covered, 55 TAXES 291 (1977), and Weithorn, Practitioner's Planning Guide to the New Lob-
bying Rules/or Public Charities, 46 J. TAx. 294 (1977).
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general public or any segment thereof.232 As a result, this section disturbs
the "equilibrium" of the Code with respect to grassroots activities. Several
factors, however, mitigate the resultant imbalance. Section 4911 only ap-
plies to public charities (other than churches) and not to private founda-
tions.233 In addition, this section does not affect the nonbusiness grassroots
lobbying expenses of individuals and other entities that remain nondeduct-
ible. One commentator discounts the possibility of section 4911 encourag-
ing significant grassroots activities because of the minimal percentages it
allows in the face of the high advertising and direct mailing costs that lob-
bying entails.234 Furthermore, section 4911 creates tax neutrality toward
direct lobbying by eliminating penalties for charities engaging in direct
lobbying activities that businesses may deduct under section 162(e)(1)(A).
The NAM bases its equal protection argument on the contention that
there is "no justification" for the discriminatory treatment accorded busi-
nesses and charitable organizations. 235 Clearly such justification exists in
the disparate resources and the concomitant potential for abuse presented
by these different entities. This justification is borne out by Bellotti's ca-
veat that the first amendment rights of corporations are guaranteed only so
long as the exercise of those rights does not jeopardize the integrity of the
electoral process. 236 Moreover, long before the enactment of section 4911,
the Cammarano holding was interpreted as evidence of a fear of the dise-
quilibrium resulting from excessive business power, rather than an en-
dorsement of equilibrium in the abstract.237 It is reasonable to assume that
the subsequent growth of business power has been sufficient to persuade
Congress that this partial subsidy of other parties' first amendment rights is
essential to maintain a proper balance. In this respect, the Fourth Circuit's
recent decision in Taxation with Representation238 again undermines the
NAM's position. In that case, the plaintiff had argued that the provisions
of sections 170(c)(3) and (4) permitting veterans' organizations and frater-
nal societies to lobby while retaining the right to receive tax-deductible
contributions violated its equal protection rights under the fifth amend-
ment. The court, however, agreed with the government that the compel-
ling societal goals served by these organizations provide ample justification
for the special tax treatment accorded them by Congress.
232. I.R.C. §§ 4911(c)(3) and 4911(d)(1)(A).
233. I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(4) and (5). Lobbying expenditures of private foundations are gov-
erned by section 4945.
234. Hearings, supra note 4, at 199 (Statement of Lester G. Fant, III, Attorney, Cohen &
Uretz, Washington, D.C.).
235. Complaint, supra note 176 at 10.
236. See text accompanying notes 214 & 222 supra.
237. Cooper, supra note 22, at 815.
238. Taxation with Representation v. United States, 586 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1978).
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More importantly, section 4911 may properly be viewed not as a new tax
exemption but as an elective statutory definition of the previous substantial
lobbying limitation. No equal protection violation exists with respect to
trade associations and other 501 (c)(6) organizations, because they too are
allowed to engage only in insubstantial grassroots lobbying.239 Similarly,
section 4911 does not distrub the tax neutrality between corporations and
individuals-i.e., neutrality at the membership level-because grassroots
lobbying expenditures remain nondeductible to both under sections 162(e)
(2)(B) and 212.
Turning to the NAM's argument that there is no justification for al-
lowing businesses to deduct direct lobbying expenses but not grassroots
expenditures, it is important to remember that the primary congressional
objective in allowing businesses to deduct direct lobbying costs was to
achieve neutrality in the tax treatment accorded businesses' communica-
tions to each of the three branches of government. 240 Furthermore,
achievement of parity with the tax-subsidized lobbying conducted by the
government and the fact that such expenses might be necessary to main-
tain a business' existence were significant considerations. 24' These rea-
sons, combined with the Bellotti rationale that no political expression may
be denied first amendment protection as long as that expression has not
attained a position of undue influence in the governing process, are suffi-
cient justification for the discriminatory tax treatment that Congress, con-
sistent with its discretion under the sixteenth amendment, has accorded
direct and indirect lobbying. Therefore, section 162(e)(2)(B) and revenue
rulings 78-111 through 78-114 must be found constitutional under both the
first and fifth amendments.
IV. THE NEED FOR IMPROVED ENFORCEMENT
While a favorable holding in National Association of Manufacturers v.
Blumenthal undoubtedly will encourage the IRS to prosecute the viola-
tions of section 162(e)(2)(B) more vigorously, it will not alter the fact that
the law, as the regulations, rulings, and audit manuals presently define it,
does not lend itself to strenuous enforcement. The rules are vague in de-
fining a nondeductible advertisement and disturbingly ineffective in deny-
ing a deduction of trade associations' grassroots lobbying expenditures to
their members.
While Revenue Ruling 78-112 makes clear that an advertisement that
239. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(3), discussed at text accompanying note 131, supra as de-
fined by I.R.M. Supp. 7(10)G-26/4(11)G-57 § 6.05 (Feb. 3, 1978), discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 159 & 161 supra.
240. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962).
241. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
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does not specifically ask readers to contact their congressmen may be con-
sidered a grassroots lobbying solicitation, 242 it does not enumerate those
factors that determine if the message as a whole is an attempt to develop a
grassroots point of view. Some guidelines that might resolve this factual
problem include whether the advertisement makes explicit or implicit ref-
erence to currently pending legislation, whether the issue addressed by the
advertisement is suitable for legislative action, and whether the general
tone of the advertisement is polemical. 243 Other pertinent considerations
are whether the advertisement engages in "direct advocacy" by suggesting
solutions to a legislative problem, or engages in subtlely biased "non-advo-
cacy" by presenting "both" sides of a complex issue in an over-simplified
and nonobjective manner. 244 In addition, it would be desirable to deter-
mine if the advertisement were part of a larger campaign that would come
within the overall ambit of section 162(e)(2)(B), or if the advertiser were
pursuing the same issue before the legislature, agencies, or courts, or
through opinion polls or public meetings. 245 Further litigation will be nec-
essary before any of these guidelines become incorporated in revenue rul-
ings, but corporations probably would be wise to heed them in the interim
in order to insure that their tax returns withstand challenge.
Taxpayer compliance with section 162(e)(2)(B) would be improved sig-
nificantly by requiring corporations to list their grassroots lobbying ex-
penses on a separate line of the corporate tax return.246 At present, only
the word "advertising" appears on the return, as an allowable deduction,
and the instructions provide no guidance for the application of section
162(e)(2)(B). 247 Similarly, voluntary compliance would be improved by
requiring corporations to label their advertisements "deductible" or "non-
deductible". This procedure both would alert the public to the political
nature of certain advertisements and facilitate audits by the IRS.
248
242. Rev. Rul. 78-112, 12 I.R.B. 8.
243. Hearings, supra note 4, at 109-110 (statement of Harvey J. Schulman, Executive
Director, Media Access Project).
244. Id. at 422-23 (statement of S. Prakash Sethi, Professor of International Business &
Business & Social Policy, University of Texas).
245. Id at 110 (statement of Harvey J. Shulman, Executive Director, Media Access Pro-
ject).
246. Id at 153.
247. Id at 204 (statement of Lester G. Fant, III, Attorney, Cohen & Uretz, Washington,
D.C.).
248. Id. at 424-26 (statement of S. Prakash Sethi, Professor of International Business &
Business & Social Policy, University of Texas). Those advertisements classified as deducti-
ble would then be subject to the FTC's substantiation requirements. See Statement of Pro-
posed Enforcement Policy by the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding
Corporate Image Advertising at 21 (December 4, 1974). Nondeductible advertisements
would remain outside the FTC's purview in order to avoid undue interference with corpora-
tions' first amendment rights.
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As far as nondeductible trade association dues are concerned, section
162(e)(2)(B) seems hopelessly unenforceable. Although the IRS has abol-
ished the fifteen percent test for determining the substantiality of an associ-
ation's grassroots activities,249 and Revenue Rulings 78-113 and 78-114250
limit the scope of associations' deductible expenses, this aspect of section
162(e)(2)(B) will remain ineffective until associations are required to in-
form their members of the extent of their nondeductible expenditures. 25'
To facilitate the audit procedure, annual reports to member companies
should be made mandatory and trade associations, like individual corpo-
rations, should be required to label their advertisements.
Obviously, a thorough audit of a member corporation would require an
audit of the association. The IRS would thus expedite enforcement by
subjecting trade associations to frequent audits. 252 Alternatively, the IRS
might eliminate the "substantiality" loophole by taxing the trade associa-
tions on their dues income to the extent of their expenditures for grassroots
lobbying.253 This would facilitate enforcement by allowing the Service to
make tax adjustments at the entity rather than the membership level and
would duplicate the economic effects of section 162(e)(2)(B)'s deduction
disallowance. Legislation to this effect could be drafted so as to be consti-
tutional under Bellotti and Cammarano.
V. CONCLUSION
Although section 162(e)(2)(B)'s disallowance of deductions for grass-
roots lobbying expenditures as an ordinary and necessary business expense
had its origins in IRS regulations that lacked statutory authority, it repre-
sents sound policy and should be strictly enforced. While businesses un-
questionably have the right to spend money to express their views on any
political issue, there is no constitutional reason for requiring these sums to
be deductible. To the contrary, there is considerable evidence showing
that corporate "warchests" inordinately influence public opinion on con-
troversial legislative issues.
Indeed, the overwhelming success of corporate grassroots lobbying com-
249. Audit Survey of "Grassroots" Lobbying and Certain Other Activities Conducted by
IRC 501(c)(5) and (c)(6) organizations, I.R.M. Supp. 7(10)G-26/4( 1)G-57 § 6.05 (Feb. 3,
1978) discussed in text accompanying notes 159-161 & 239 supra.
250. Rev. Ruls. 78-113 and 78-114, 1978-1 C.B. 43, 44.
251. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 155 (statement of Harvey J. Shulman, Executive
Director, Media Access Project).
252. The Audit Survey of February 3, 1978, set objectives that indicate an intent to pur-
sue this policy. I.R.M. Supp. 7(10)G-26/4(11)G-57 § 2.04.




pels construction of section 162(e)(2)(B) to its fullest extent. While the lan-
guage of section 162(e)(2)(B) prohibits only the deduction of expenditures
incurred "in connection with any attempt to influence the general public,
or segments thereof," it is clear that Congress intended a business' commu-
nications to parties in the special relationships of employee or shareholder
status to come within the ambit of this prohibition. Revenue Rulings 78-
111 through 78-114, which make such communications by a trade associa-
tion to which a business belongs explicitly nondeductible, are thus clearly
authorized by the Code.
These rulings, and section 162(e)(2)(B) are also consistent with Bellotti,
which prohibited only direct restraints on corporate speech and implied
that denial of a deduction for businesses' grassroots lobbying expenditures
is a permissible means to balance the competing first amendment rights of
individuals and corporations.
Nor does the fact that the Internal Revenue Code subsidizes the direct
lobbying expenses of corporations render section 162(e)(2)(B) unconstitu-
tional. Although this provision undermines the tax neutrality premise, it
does not impair the basic principle that businesses are not denied a tax
deduction because they engage in first amendment speech. Rather, section
162(e)(2)(B) merely requires businesses to pay for their grassroots activities
entirely out of their own pockets. The fact that Congress in its discretion
may choose to subsidize some first amendment rights does not imply that
all free speech rights may not be fully realized absent equivalent subsidiza-
tion.
Most importantly, although the present laws are essential to protect the
integrity of the legislative process, they are not amenable to rigorous en-
forcement. Substantial structural revision, including imposition of the tax
on the trade associations rather than their members and more detailed
definitional guidance, is necessary to make the rules effective.
Anne M Krauskopf
ADDENDUM
On March 7, 1979, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers v. Blumenthal, No. 78-0874 (D.D.C. March 7, 1979),
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge John Lewis Smith, Jr. found
the action to be barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)
(1976). The court specifically noted that "the governmental interests found
[to exist by the Supreme Court in Cammarano] arguably provide a reason-
able basis for the prohibition against deducting these expenses in satisfac-
tion of the equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment." Slip
op. at 2. The NAM indicated its intent to appeal.
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